“To Make Collective Action Possible”: The Founding of the AAUP
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Abstract
The article reviews the developments that led to the founding of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). The AAUP was not founded specifically as the primary defender of academic freedom that it subsequently became. Its broader goal was to further the professionalization of the professoriate. Locally, the Association’s founders hoped to reform university governance by shifting the balance of power away from presidents and lay governance boards. Nationally, the Association was to serve as a body to speak for the profession as a whole in response to organized efforts to standardize American higher education - efforts that did not provide an adequate voice to the burgeoning profession.

Events before, during, and following the founding meeting in 1915, as well as the efforts of two of its founders, Arthur Lovejoy and E.R.A. Seligman, brought about the early focus on academic freedom. The major achievements of the AAUP in 1915 were the investigation of the University of Utah and the 1915 Declaration of Principles, which served as the founding document of the Association and still serves as the intellectual foundation of the American conception of academic freedom. These early events set the subsequent course of the Association.

The university is the noblest monument which we have inherited from the past and at the same time the most powerful engine driving forward our civilization. We owe it the tribute of truth and the duty of service. It is
our part to make it a democracy of scholars serving the larger democracy to which it belongs.
—James McKeen Cattell, “Democracy in University Administration”

Professionalizing Higher Education

When considering the work of the American Association of University Professors throughout its first one hundred years, one might surmise that the AAUP was founded first and foremost to defend academic freedom. However, this was not the main or exclusive aim of the founders. Rather, the AAUP was conceived to further the professionalization of the professoriate, a project in which the establishment of academic freedom played an important part—but only a part. In 1914 AAUP founder and Johns Hopkins University philosophy professor Arthur O. Lovejoy addressed what he perceived to be the challenges to this project and proposed that a “national Association of University Professors,” then in the process of being organized, should do for the professoriate

what the American Bar Association does for the lawyers and the American Medical Association for the physicians; an organization, that is, which should cultivate a wholesome esprit de corps and a sense of the special responsibilities of the profession; should act steadily for the maintenance of the standards, the increase of the efficiency, and the defence of the proper prerogatives of the guild; which should provide stated occasions for the discussion of questions of common interest, and a regular means for the formation and the authoritative expression of the collective opinion of the professional body on all such matters as properly concern its interests or those of higher education and of research.¹

Lovejoy considered violations of academic freedom, which he singled out as being of “utmost importance,” as specific cases of interfering with professional autonomy, or, in Lovejoy’s words, “the proper prerogatives of the guild.” But he, like first AAUP president and Columbia University philosophy professor John Dewey, thought that such violations occurred “only intermittently,” or, as Dewey noted in his address at the founding meeting of the Association, “too rarely] to demand or even suggest the formation of an association like this.”²

About six weeks before the organizational meeting of the AAUP, Lovejoy wrote to the editors of Science, “In the current number of The Atlantic Monthly there appears . . . a statement concerning the committee on the organization of a national Association of University Professors. The statement seriously misrepresents the functions of the committee and the purposes of those interested in the organization of the new society. . . . The committee is in no sense a body for the investigation of grievances or for the examination of internal conditions in American universities.”³
While Lovejoy’s subsequent involvement in academic freedom investigations gives some indication of his own preference for these activities within the Association, emphasizing them early on was not favored by a majority of the committee that organized the founding meeting, and it remained controversial during the early history of the Association. While concerns over academic freedom were clearly on the minds of the founders, they were largely subsumed under broader concerns.

The Balance of Power

What, then, were the broader issues that the founders thought should be addressed in order to further the professionalization of the professoriate? In brief, their primary concern was to change the balance of power in the American university: “Of more constant and more general significance is the question of the relation of the professorate to the government of universities and the control of their policies.” As Lovejoy noted, professors differed from usually self-employed lawyers and physicians in that they legally were employees of corporations governed by lay boards, which appointed a president to operate the university on their behalf.

Concern about the distribution of power in the American university was widespread among professors at the time. Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century, the most outspoken critic of the prevailing order was Columbia psychology professor James McKeen Cattell. An eminent scientist, he was the editor of several scientific journals, including Science, in which he regularly reported on the dismissals of professors and commented on other issues in higher education. Cattell was active in the founding of the AAUP; in fact, in 1912, he was among the first to call for its founding: “It may be that the time has now come when it is desirable and possible to form an association of professors of American universities . . . , the objects of which would be to promote the interests of the universities and to advance higher education and research, with special reference to problems of administration and to the status of the professors and other officers of the university.” At Columbia, Cattell battled fiercely with president Nicholas Murray Butler over what he saw as “academic autocracy.” Cattell outlined his views of how to reform institutional governance in a series of articles titled “University Control,” which he subsequently published in book form. Cattell was an eloquent advocate for the elimination of the office of the university president in its prevailing form. He summarized his objection as follows: “The trouble in the case of the university president is that he is not a leader, but a boss. He is selected by and is responsible to a body practically outside the university, which in the private corporations is responsible to nobody.”

At Columbia, Cattell was repeatedly threatened with dismissal because of his views, but apparently also because of his sometimes eccentric behavior. He was in fact dismissed in 1917 over his opposition to conscription during World War I.
Cattell’s proposals were very detailed. The core recommendation was to have the governing board be elected by a corporation consisting of the faculty, the other officers of the university, and the alumni. The role of the trustees would simply be to exercise oversight. The election of the president would be the responsibility of the faculty alone.\(^8\)

Since the Association initially sought to invite the most highly respected academics for membership, Cattell sent to Dewey many lists of potential members. Cattell had published a biographical dictionary of *American Men of Science* in 1906 and had ranked from among them the one thousand most prominent, which proved helpful in trying to find potential charter members. Following his service as a delegate to the first organizational meeting, Cattell did not play a role in the leadership or the central committees of the Association, noting to Lovejoy in 1913, “It is just as well that I, belonging to the extreme left wing of the fraternity, should not take a prominent part in the organization, though I want to do everything I can to help.”\(^9\)

In spite of identifying himself as an outlier, Cattell’s views overlapped significantly with those of AAUP founders generally considered more conservative, most notably Lovejoy and Columbia economics professor E. R. A. Seligman. While they differed with Cattell regarding the scope and speed with which university control should be reformed, they agreed that the university needed to be democratized. Their rhetoric closely matched that of Progressive Era reform movements that called for the democratization of American society through such means as the direct elections of US senators, primaries, recalls, and referenda. Thus, Seligman, speaking in 1916, echoed Theodore Roosevelt’s description of the Progressive Movement’s “fierce discontent”: “The four characteristic institutions of the American university are respectively the trustees, the president, the faculty, and the student body. With respect to each of these there has recently been much discussion and not a little criticism—symptoms of the healthy discontent which is the first condition of progress.”\(^10\) Noting that some wanted to eliminate the office of the university president immediately, Seligman cautioned that “autocracy never gives way to democracy by any such sudden jump,” comparing it to the development of British democracy through intermediate stages including an “aristocratic republic.” Seligman believed that the stage of aristocratic republic would continue for some time in universities, so long as presidents and trustees behaved wisely in observing the proper role of the faculty. However, Seligman’s Progressive disposition was clearly evident in the comparison; that is, he chose the comparison because he believed that universities would eventually progress toward democracy. Stressing the obligations of faculty and students in promoting the ideals of higher education, he noted that the university “will deserve to become a real democracy only when the ideals of the true university animate every instructor and every student.”\(^11\)

Without committing himself on the swiftness with which reform should occur, Lovejoy expressed
doubt that the prevailing governance structure could continue unchanged:

No arrangement in which the university teaching profession has even a limited jurisdiction over university policies only upon sufferance and by a sort of double delegation of authority; in which it has little or no control over the recruiting, the conditions of the tenure of office and of the professional advancement, of its own members; in which its affairs are managed and its destinies determined by powerful appointive officials in no way responsible to it; and in which its only legal or formally recognized status in the universities whose work it carries on is that of a body of employees of corporations composed of members of other professions: no such arrangement is likely to be regarded as permanently endurable by the university teachers of America when as a class they attain a fully developed professional self-consciousness and a due sense of their special responsibilities as the “natural”—though not the exclusive—custodians of the higher educational and scientific interests of the community.¹²

Lovejoy outlined a proposal for an alternate arrangement, in which the faculty would function as an autonomous guild and the governing board would have ultimate financial authority and veto power over the faculty’s election of the president. Though both wanted to reform the office of the president, neither Lovejoy nor Cattell advocated the elimination of governing boards.¹³

While the Association’s early leaders eloquently formulated the principles of academic freedom in the first year of its existence, the first formal statement on matters of governance by the AAUP’s Committee on Place and Function of Faculties in University Government and Administration appeared only later, in 1920. With the already waning Progressive Era and perhaps out of realism about the likelihood of affecting the kinds of changes Cattell, Lovejoy, and Seligman advocated to different degrees, the AAUP never went as far in recommending changes to college and university governance as its early leaders did in their own publications.¹⁴

Although not its primary goal, the defense of academic freedom quickly came to dominate the Association’s activities.

Public Debates over Academic Freedom

The publications by Cattell, Lovejoy, and Seligman were part of an expansive public debate over academic freedom and the proper allocation of authority in the modern university that was being conducted in a variety of venues ranging from the muckraking press to meetings of professional and disciplinary organizations. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw significant changes to the structure and role of higher
education, including increased numbers of students and faculty—and greater endowments. These changes accompanied the significant changes to American society during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Walter Metzger in particular has stressed the importance of changes in higher education for the founding of the AAUP. Both were significant to the development of academic freedom.15

The press was not always inclined to support academic freedom. For example, the New York Times commented on the establishment of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure by the American Political Science Association by condemning the tying of academic freedom to tenure.

Somewhere there must lie the power as to what shall be taught, how, and by whom. It is inconceivable that the persons having this power and responsibility in, say, a college for young women should retain a professor who deemed it due to his conscience to teach the doctrine of free love and to advocate its practice. Or, to come nearer to the matters with which the American Political Science Association deals, it is not credible that a professor should continue to receive pay who thought it his duty to teach the doctrine of sheer fiat money.16

Dewey later wrote in a letter to the editor in response to a similar editorial “the position of The Times in such matters is firmly established, and no one, I am sure, grudges economic interests such a competent organ.” While “free love” was often invoked as the limiting case for academic freedom, the subsequent replacement of the gold standard with fiat money throughout the world shows the wrongheadedness of marshaling “common sense” to suppress academic freedom. An amusing example dates from 1899: listing the many pernicious doctrines that professors might teach, an editorial in Gunton’s Magazine noted, “They may be socialists, single-taxers, flying machine advocates . . .”17

A central concern regarding the relationship between professionalization and academic freedom was that professors were advocating views considered unacceptable. At the same time, public debates over academic freedom sometimes cast suspicions on individual professors’ motives for holding views that were considered acceptable. Seligman was widely considered a economic conservative. He publicly debated proponents of the single-tax and socialism. His views did not offend the Columbia authorities, so he did not have to fear administrative interference. However, participants in public debates over academic freedom sometimes accused those who agreed with prevailing attitudes of taking such positions out of fear. Thus, Seligman was directly affected by the perceived lack of academic freedom: lack of academic freedom at times undermined the desired professional status of a professor as an impartial expert.18

Academic Freedom
The American conception of academic freedom was strongly influenced by, although not identical to, the one prevalent in Germany. In the late nineteenth century, many American academics had obtained their PhD degrees abroad, most often in Germany. German professors had Lehrfreiheit, freedom of teaching, and the Prussian constitution of 1848 noted that “science and its teaching shall be free.” When these American academics returned home, they found that the degrees they had obtained in order to enter the academic profession did not give them the same professional autonomy they had come to expect.19

The beginning of the modern American conception of academic freedom is usually dated to the 1890s. The Panic of 1893, with its run on the gold supply followed by an extended economic depression, intensified labor disputes. During the summer of 1894, the Pullman Strike raged in Chicago. At the same time, the development of the social sciences in the context of the emerging Progressive Era, which placed an emphasis on seeking scientific solutions to problems that accompanied the economic and social developments of the period, brought individual social scientists into conflict with powerful interests. Some of these social scientists were among the most prominent members of the academic establishment. Yet, with the traditional source of authority of universities vested in governing boards, increasingly populated by business leaders and corporate lawyers, such conflicts sometimes led to the dismissal of faculty members. At the beginning point of the development of the American conception of academic freedom, it simply did not exist in the form that we are accustomed to today.20

The development of the press during this period is of particular importance for the development of academic freedom. The reason why there were academic freedom cases was that they were reported in the press, causing negative publicity for university presidents. The emergence of the “robber barons” of the Gilded Age brought with it a public debate over the influence that their wealth exerted on society. When some of them endowed private universities, the concern that they would control those universities increased the interest in such cases. Thus, when Edward Bemis was dismissed from the Rockefeller-endowed University of Chicago in 1895, in part because of he attended events related to the Pullman Strike, it was widely reported in the press.21

The activities of professors, however, such as speaking publicly or in the classroom on controversial matters, also found significant coverage in the press, often to the chagrin of presidents. As Laurence Veysey noted about the origins of academic freedom in the United States, “Resistance to academic freedom [by administrators] was not so much a matter of principle as it was an aspect of public relations. The passions of the non-academic population . . . were permitted to govern the university’s attitude from season to season. . . . The history of academic freedom in America thus became a rather accurate reflection of social alarm felt at any given hour by the more substantial elements in the American population.”22 However, given the significant interest of the press in violations of academic freedom, Veysey’s observation can be extended in
the other direction as well: support of academic freedom by administrators was often not so much a matter of principle as it was an aspect of public relations.

The turn of the century saw a system of higher education that consisted of three basic kinds of mainstream institutions: the denominational colleges, the endowed institutions, and the state universities. Their distribution had regional peculiarities, with endowed institutions predominantly in the East, state universities in the Midwest and West, and the denominational colleges in the East and Midwest. Because of a corresponding distribution of political interest, with the Populist movement more prevalent in the Midwest and West and a more conservative East, the external influences on higher education differed between regions. This difference meant that violations of academic freedom were frequently specific to the kind of institution at which they occurred and thus to their regions.23

An important early academic freedom case was that of Brown University president E. Benjamin Andrews in 1897. In an autobiographical sketch, Seligman identified it as the first case that he became personally involved in.

The silver agitation during the [William Jennings] Bryan campaign in the nineties brought forth the first crop of attempts to interfere for economic reasons with academic freedom in the United States. In the state universities of the West the upholders of gold monometallism were harried and not infrequently dismissed; in the private universities of the East the few advocates of bimetallism were subjected to persecution. Among the most prominent of these was President Andrews of Brown University, and it was in order to stem this tide that Professor [Frank William] Taussig and I issued a public protest, which was not without influence.24

According to the trustees, Andrews’s public advocacy for the monetization prevented him from securing certain donations to the university. In particular, after the graduation of John D. Rockefeller’s son from Brown, the trustees had expected a significant contribution to the endowment. When that was not forthcoming, they asked of Andrews “not a renunciation of these views, as honestly entertained by him, but a forbearance, out of regard for the interests of the University, to promulgate them.” In response, Andrews resigned, noting that he saw himself unable to carry out the wishes of the trustees “without surrendering that reasonable liberty of utterance which my predecessors, my faculty colleagues and myself have hitherto enjoyed, and in the absence of which the most ample endowment for an educational institution would have but little worth.” The public protest that resulted in the press, within the faculty, and by members of the American Economic Association, organized by Seligman, led the trustees to retract the request and reinstate Andrews.25
The Ross Case

While both the Bemis and Andrews cases generated significant public attention, they were dwarfed by the case of Edward Ross at Stanford University, which has reached iconic status in the historiography of academic freedom. Even in comparison to the other endowed institutions at the time, Stanford University was in a rather unusual situation. It had only one trustee, the widow of founder Leland Stanford, Jane. While Leland Stanford had recruited the widely respected educator David Starr Jordan as president to build the institution, after Stanford’s death Jane Stanford took a personal interest in the university, named in honor of the Stanfords’ deceased only child. With her late husband’s inheritance held up in probate, she had to declare the faculty her personal servants to be able to pay their salaries. When Ross, who had been recruited by Jordan, advocated in 1896 on behalf of Bryan’s campaign for president of the United States, Jane Stanford took notice. Stanford’s fortune had been made in the construction of railroads, and when Ross later publicly opposed the importation of Chinese labor, she demanded that Jordan dismiss him. Her protests to the contrary afterward notwithstanding, Jordan was well aware of the impact that dismissing Ross would have on the university’s standing.26

In 1901 Jordan followed Jane Stanford’s order and accepted Ross’s forced resignation. However, Ross immediately used the press to generate public attention. With resentment against Leland Stanford still felt and with his widow’s rather strange involvement in the running of the university, press coverage was sufficient to cause the American Economic Association (AEA), which had not been involved in academic freedom cases in any official capacity up to that point, to appoint a committee to investigate. The committee consisted of three economists: Henry Farnam (Yale), Henry Gardner (Brown), and Seligman, who chaired it. The committee’s report, although in the end not issued officially by the AEA, was the first investigative report of an academic freedom violation in the United States. While some members of the faculty resigned immediately after Ross’s dismissal, several more resigned when the administration orchestrated a letter signed by a significant number of faculty members, disavowing any violation of academic freedom by Jordan. Both Lovejoy and Frank A. Fetter, later a Princeton economics professor, were among those who resigned in the second wave.27

University presidents took notice of these developments. For example, the files of President William Rainey Harper at the University of Chicago, who had dismissed Bemis, contain a carefully marked-up copy of the Ross report. Further, as Seligman noted in his autobiography, “The result was that for not a few years Leland Stanford University found it impossible to secure any competent scientist to fill the chair of economics.”28
For the next several years, no cases of violations of academic freedom received extended public attention. In part, this was presumably because presidents were more careful not to generate the kind of evidence that the Ross case had produced. As Ross himself remarked some years later,

Of course, a great majority of the cases in which a man is gotten rid of on account of the offensiveness of his teachings or public utterances to the financial powers behind endowed institutions never bring up the question of “academic freedom” at all. It is so easy to let the man know that he is not making good or to declare that he is not a successful teacher, or to boost him into a better paying job, or to abolish the chair under the pretext of insufficiency of funds. . . . The only wonder is that there ever was any case that presented the question of academic freedom. Nothing but the honesty or the blundering of a college president could ever allow such a case to show itself.²⁹

In the absence of an association or organization to which to turn, an academic freedom case also requires that the dismissed faculty member be willing to go public, which could easily complicate obtaining subsequent employment. For instance, Bemis briefly found academic employment after his dismissal from the University of Chicago, but he spent the majority of his career working for municipal utility companies. Ross had some difficulty finding a position following his dismissal but was hired by University of Nebraska president Andrews, who had left Brown only a year after his reinstatement. As Cattell noted, “The professor is naturally disinclined to drag the ‘pageant of his bleeding heart’ across the continent and have his name put on the employer’s black list.”³⁰

The Mecklin Case

In June 1913 Cattell’s Science reported that “Dr. John M. Mecklin has resigned the professorship of mental and moral philosophy at Lafayette College because his teaching was regarded as not in accord with the standards of the Presbyterian church.”³¹ Mecklin subsequently wrote a letter to the Journal of Philosophy stating that the university authorities’ objection to his use of certain texts in philosophy classes were the cause for his resignation. As a result, the American Philosophical Association and the American Psychological Association appointed a committee of inquiry, chaired by Lovejoy. Like the Ross investigation, the Mecklin investigation was conducted by letter only and was frustrated by the refusal of Lafayette’s president, Ethlebert Warfield, to explain his actions. It differed from the Ross investigation in an important respect: rather than simply attempting to establish the facts in the specific case under investigation, the committee saw its role as commenting on the conditions of academic freedom and tenure generally at the institution. In that way, the report served as a model for future investigative reports of the AAUP. The committee of inquiry concluded
that, “In view of these facts, the committee is forced to conclude that at Lafayette College at the present time tenue of the professorship of philosophy and psychology is, in practise, subject, not only to the requirement that the teachings of the incumbent shall be in substantial harmony with the commonly accepted doctrines of the Presbyterian Church, but also to the requirement that his teachings shall be in substantial harmony with the theological opinions of the administrative authorities of the college, and with their interpretation of the philosophical implications of those opinions.”

**Hopkins Call**

In an interview with Walter Metzger, Lovejoy recalled that he waited to start the AAUP until he joined Johns Hopkins University because it was one of the “foremost universities of the country.” He believed that the prestige associated with Johns Hopkins would help make the Association succeed. Already, some of the most important disciplinary associations had been organized by faculty from Hopkins.

The Hopkins call was sent in the spring of 1913 by “most of the full professors of the faculty of the Johns Hopkins University” to the faculties of nine other universities. The call specifically listed “general principles respecting the tenure of the professorial office” and “the establishment of a representative judicial committee” to investigate violations of academic freedom among the reasons for the founding of the Association.

The first organizational meeting of the Association was held at Hopkins in November 1913. The main point of discussion was whether membership in the Association should be institutional, as in the Association of American Universities, or individual. The delegates to the meeting were in fact institutional, on the presumption that this was going to be the organizational model. Present were representatives from Harvard, Yale, Clark, Columbia, Cornell, Princeton, Hopkins, and Wisconsin. However, the meeting decided that membership “should be chosen on the basis of scholarly standing and productiveness rather than connection with a particular institution.” It appointed a committee to invite reputable scholars to membership.

In November 1914, a call for the meeting to organize the Association was issued. The call noted, “The general purposes of such an Association would be to facilitate a more effective co-operation among the members of the profession in the discharge of their special responsibilities as custodians of the interests of higher education and research in America; to promote a more general and methodical discussion of problems relating to education in higher institutions of learning; to create means for the authoritative expression of the public opinion of college and university teachers; to make collective action possible; and to maintain and advance the standards and ideals of the profession.”
Why did Lovejoy organize the Hopkins call? Much is made of his resignation from Stanford in response to the Ross case. While clearly an important event in the history of academic freedom and for Lovejoy personally, it occurred in 1901—twelve years before the Hopkins call. Lovejoy biographer Daniel Wilson argues that what led to Lovejoy’s involvement in the founding of the AAUP was his failed attempt to influence the policies of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 1910, which led him to realize the need for a venue that would enable the “authoritative expression of the collective opinion of the professional body” and “make collective action possible.” In fact, the Carnegie Foundation played a significant and perhaps underappreciated role in the formation and early activities of the AAUP.  

The Carnegie Foundation

The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching was created with a $10 million endowment by Andrew Carnegie in 1905. Carnegie’s goal was to fund pensions for faculty members across the country, excluding those at denominational colleges. Henry Pritchett, who had served as president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was recruited by Carnegie as the foundation’s first president, and its Board of Trustees consisted primarily of university presidents of major universities. Although its goal was to distribute pensions, the foundation turned its attention almost immediately to identifying standards to categorize the wide variety of institutions calling themselves a “college” or “university.” In spite of Carnegie’s avowed preference to support small colleges over well-endowed institutions, Pritchett not only wished to bring order to American higher education but was perhaps also animated by the social Darwinism of the time in trying to support stronger institutions over weaker ones. Thus, the first Approved List of institutions eligible for support by the Carnegie Foundation consisted primarily of the premier colleges and universities of the time, most of which still hold that position today.  

Given the financial incentive that the pension fund represented, some institutions abandoned their denominational control by amending their charter and some modified degree requirements in order to join the Approved List. Perhaps the Carnegie Foundation’s greatest impact on higher education was the so-called Flexner Report, published in 1910, a detailed study of medical education in the United States that led to wholesale revisions of medical curricula and the closing of some medical schools. Given the significant impact of the Carnegie Foundation, Pritchett’s power was compared to that of the Prussian minister of education. Just as there was significant concern over the independence of the privately endowed universities, the potential for privately endowed foundations, and thus their private interests, to influence the direction of higher education was widely debated. For instance, when President Andrews requested that the state legislature permit the University of Nebraska to apply for Carnegie pensions, William Jennings Bryan
successfully led a campaign in the Nebraska state house against it, calling it “the most insidious poison that now threatens our nation.”

In 1900 many of the same institutions whose presidents would serve on the Carnegie Foundation’s Board of Trustees created the Association of American Universities (AAU). One of the AAU’s initial goals was to bring about “a greater uniformity of the conditions under which students may become candidates for higher degrees in different American universities.” Finally, the Office of Education in the US Department of the Interior, the predecessor of the US Department of Education, hired its first specialist in higher education in 1911 and began to publish much more elaborate statistics and lengthy reports. At the same time, the office attempted to produce its first ranking of institutions, a report suppressed by executive order of President William Howard Taft after complaints by university presidents.

In none of these attempts to systematize and standardize US higher education did the faculty play an appreciable role. In addition, the smaller colleges, and in particular the denominational colleges, left behind by the foundation, felt threatened by these developments because they did not have an active role in them, either. It is therefore no accident that the AAUP and Association of American Colleges (AAC, now the Association of American Colleges and Universities) were both founded in 1915 with something of a defensive stance.

The Joint Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure

In December 1913 the meetings of the American Economic Association, the American Sociological Society, and the American Political Science Association passed identical resolutions to create committees on academic freedom and tenure, each to have three members. The charge of each committee was “to examine and report on the present situation in American educational institutions as to liberty of thought, freedom of speech, and security of tenure for teachers” within its respective discipline. According to the minutes of the meeting of the American Economic Association, the motion to form the committee of that association was made by Frank Fetter.

In March 1914 Albion Small, head of the sociology department at the University of Chicago and outgoing president of the American Sociological Society, informed incoming president Edward Ross of the creation of the committee and asked Ross to appoint its members in his stead. Small noted that “the immediate impulse was the Mecklin case at Lafayette, together with some rumors that things are not all as they should be at Pennsylvania.” Small referred most likely to the developing case of Scott Nearing, whom the trustees subsequently dismissed in 1915 because of his public opposition to child labor and whose case the AAUP investigated. Small noted to Ross that Seligman was coordinating the three committees.

With Seligman’s approval, Ross appointed Harvard law professor Roscoe Pound, University of
Pennsylvania sociology professor James Lichtenberger, and Indiana University sociology professor U. G. Weatherly. The three representatives of the American Economic Association were Seligman, Fetter, and University of Wisconsin economics professor Richard Ely. All three were past presidents of the AEA, and all three had extensive direct experience with academic freedom issues. In fact, Ely had been tried and exculpated by a committee of the regents of the University of Wisconsin in 1894 appointed to investigate public charges that Ely’s writings contained “utopian, impractical, and pernicious doctrines.”44

The representatives of the American Political Science Association (APSA) were somewhat more unusual. APSA president and Columbia University political science professor John Bassett Moore informed Seligman that he wished to appoint a committee of only nonacademics so as “to relieve the present inquiry of its tendency to assume a purely class aspect.” Seligman expressed strong reservations to Moore’s plan, noting that, in addition to the lack of expertise of nonacademics serving on such a committee, academic freedom served the public interest as well as the professional “class interest” of faculty. Moore subsequently appointed J. Q. Dealey, a political science professor at Brown University. Dealey did have direct experience related to academic freedom: having just become a faculty member at Brown when the Andrews case occurred, he was among the signatories of a resolution by the faculty to the governing board defending President Andrews. Moore also appointed two nonacademics, former APSA president Frederick N. Judson, a lawyer from St. Louis who had been actively involved in public school reform there, and Herbert Croly, author of _The Promise of American Life_ and editor of the _New Republic_, which he helped found in 1914. Seligman’s concerns were well-founded. Neither Judson nor Croly contributed much to the committee, and neither was eligible to join the AAUP’s committee on academic freedom that was an immediate outgrowth of the three committees. Lovejoy commented specifically at the time that one of the reasons that an association of university professors should handle investigations was because the disciplinary associations frequently had nonacademic members.45

Each of the three committees had been “authorized to cooperate with any similar committee that may be constituted” by the other associations. In June 1914 the three committees held their first meeting and decided to combine into the Joint Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, sometimes referred to as “the joint committee of nine.” It received two complaints over dismissals of faculty members: the case of Willard Fisher at Wesleyan University and the case of Anson E. Morse at Marietta College. The committee invited Carnegie Foundation president Pritchett to one of its meetings and requested that the Carnegie Foundation investigate the two cases on behalf of the committee.46

The Carnegie Foundation’s role in investigating such violations has been neglected in histories of academic freedom. Judging from the entirety of the institutional files of the Carnegie Foundation, it appears that it handled a fair number of complaints, mostly of two kinds: political intrusion in state universities and religious intrusion in colleges. The former cases were clearly Pritchett’s main interest, the latter were in
conflict with Carnegie’s charge not to support denominational institutions, and religious intrusion at institutions on the Approved List thus raised questions about approved institutions’ declaration that they were not under denominational control. Pritchett’s hostility to state universities dated to his presidency of MIT, where he saw these institutions as less expensive competitors whose public support forced them to operate on an unequal playing field. He initially refused to extend the benefits of the Carnegie Foundation to state universities, in spite of Carnegie’s own willingness to include them. After they were included, Pritchett repeatedly reported on political interference in their operations in the foundation’s annual report.47

Interestingly, none of the cases in the foundation’s archives were concerned with faculty being dismissed for speaking on social or economic matters, perhaps reflecting the expectation that a foundation supported by the same financial interest that these faculty were criticizing would not come to their aid. In any event, of particular importance is that, contrary to some historians’ beliefs, the cases in the files demonstrate that there were academic freedom violations between 1901 and 1913. This, in turn, reflects on claims that the AAUP faced a sudden increase in academic freedom cases on its founding, when it actually appears that academic freedom violations occurred throughout that decade and a half but that there was a dearth of places for aggrieved professors to turn.48

While only the case at the University of Oklahoma will be discussed here, two other notable cases in that period are that of Fritz Darrow at Drury College, which was reported to the Carnegie Foundation, and that of Charles Zueblin at the University of Chicago. One case that Pritchett took particular interest in was a case of multiple dismissals, apparently based on political considerations, at the University of Oklahoma. Similar large-scale dismissals had occurred at other state institutions following a change in a political party’s electoral fortunes. For example, Edward Bemis was appointed at Kansas State Agricultural College in 1896 to replace professors dismissed when the Populist movement won control of the state legislature, only to be dismissed himself with several of his colleagues in 1899 after elections turned against the movement.49

In 1907 Oklahoma was admitted to statehood, and Democrat Charles Haskell was elected the first governor of the state. As the territory had been mainly governed by Republicans, Haskell dismissed the regents, and the newly appointed regents went to Norman to interview each of the faculty members to determine who should be retained. There had been repeated rumors of loose morals among the faculty of the university, including such charges as dancing, playing cards, and smoking. In the end, the regents did not reappoint President David Boyd and eight of the faculty’s twenty-eight members. Among the faculty members dismissed was influential historian Vernon Louis Parrington. Both Parrington and Boyd wrote at length to the Carnegie Foundation. In response, Pritchett traveled to Norman to conduct an investigation.50

The result of Pritchett’s inquiry, which was published in the annual report of the Carnegie Foundation, is perhaps most notable for its strong criticism of the regents, calling them “entirely ignorant of
university administration,” while acknowledging that they were “honorable and high-minded men.” The report included a lengthy discussion of Pritchett’s views on the proper role of governing boards to govern and not to administer. Also notable is Pritchett’s repeated insistence that universities be free of both political and denominational control, while failing to address in any way the influence of private wealth and interest on universities.51

It was understandable that Seligman and the joint committee of nine thought that Pritchett, having traveled to Oklahoma and published a detailed report, might be able to help. He also clearly had significant authority, which they hoped would compel institutions to give responses that the presidents in the Ross and Mecklin cases had been unwilling to provide. However, at that point, the general policy of the Carnegie Foundation was simply to request statements from the institutions accused of violating a faculty member’s academic freedom and not to further act on them. Although it commented on political influence in higher education in its annual report for several more years, the foundation did not publish reports of individual cases.52

Seligman thus expressed significant disappointment over the foundation’s failure to investigate the two cases he had forwarded to Pritchett. Seligman conducted an investigation of the Fisher case himself, and while Fetter produced a lengthy report that remains unpublished, only a brief report was produced by the AAUP’s committee in 1916. Morse contacted Seligman to withdraw his complaint. The Joint Committee issued a preliminary report in 1914, which served as a precursor to the Association’s 1915 Declaration of Principles of Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure.53

The Founding of the AAUP

The American Association of University Professors was founded at a meeting on January 1 and 2, 1915, in the Chemists’ Club in New York City. Some 250 professors were in attendance. Much of the meeting was taken up by the approval of the constitution, discussions of the conditions for membership, and the question of whether to establish local chapters. Membership was initially restricted to faculty members with ten years of service to the academic profession who had been nominated and approved by a vote of the membership. A point of significant discussion was the eligibility of university presidents for membership, reflecting the wider acceptance of presidents as members of the faculty. In response to a motion that they be admitted with the right to speak but not vote, Cattell proposed the devilishly clever amendment that they be admitted with the right to vote but not speak. In the end, university presidents were ineligible for membership. A proposal to make deans ineligible was not approved.54

The meeting elected John Dewey as the first president of the Association and considered which
topics to place on the Association’s agenda. The Committee on Organization had solicited proposals for such topics from those invited for membership. What appears to be a tally of votes cast by members of the committee on a proposal to consider academic freedom as a topic for the Association shows that the committee voted against including it. Instead, it presented to the meeting two topics: the methods of appointment and promotion and the manner in which the university teaching profession is recruited.

Seligman later recounted that while the Association was discussing what topics should be taken up by the council for investigation during the coming year, the chairman of the joint committee of nine [i.e., Seligman himself], who happened to be present, suggested that it might be well to consider also the general problems of academic tenure and academic freedom. The motives which impelled him to make this suggestion were twofold. In the first place it was realized that while the teachers of political and social science were today primarily the ones on the firing line, they were by no means the only ones; and that not a few cases affecting the other sciences, both the natural sciences and the philosophical sciences, presented themselves from time to time. A more comprehensive body like the new association was obviously the one best fitted to consider the broader aspects of the entire problem. The second consideration which was responsible for the motion was the hope that when the new and enlarged committee was formed, the joint committee of nine might be allowed to go out of existence and its chairman be permitted to give up the responsibility which was weighing so heavily upon him.

The motion to add academic freedom and tenure to the topics under the consideration of the Association during its first year then passed.55

A fourth item was added to the agenda. Harvard philosophy professor Josiah Royce presented a paper titled “The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and Middlebury College.” In 1914, at the request of the state government, the foundation had conducted a study of Vermont’s education system recommending that, among other things, in Royce’s words, “Either the state must completely own and control an institution or it must leave it wholly to private benefaction.” The Carnegie Foundation was thus recommending that the State of Vermont no longer support in any way the private colleges, such as Middlebury, that were located there. Royce remarked about the foundation that “like any body whose interests are primarily administrative it has shown a strong tendency to standardize our academic institutions” and that he was concerned about its possible interference with individual and institutional independence. In response, the meeting authorized the council to appoint a committee on the “Limits of Standardization of
The Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure

Following up on the motion to consider the issue of academic freedom proved to be slow going. While Seligman had initially hoped that the Association would simply take the issue of academic freedom over from the joint committee, by the middle of March, Seligman, “on further reflection,” concluded that the joint committee needed to make a final report. Princeton psychology professor Howard C. Warren wrote to Seligman repeatedly and encouraged him to continue to work on the issue, noting that “there will be considerable inertia in a large and new association which will prevent it from taking up the problem immediately.” Warren had served with Lovejoy as a member of the panel investigating the Mecklin case.

Events at the University of Utah made the problem impossible for the Association to ignore. As the Association’s first investigative report notes, “On March 18, 1915, and within the five weeks following, seventeen members of the faculty of the University of Utah resigned their positions in protest against certain acts of the President of the University (Dr. J. T. Kingsbury) and of the Board of Regents.”

On March 26 Dewey wrote to Seligman that it would “obviously be a great mistake for the joint committee on academic freedom to break off its work in the middle.” Noting that “it is possible that were it not for the Univ of Utah case, it might well be for the general Association to take no action at all this year, but a great many lines of work appear to be represented in the men affected there.”

The number of disciplines represented in the resignations meant that the case could not easily be sent to one or two disciplinary associations to investigate. Early discussions on whether to take up investigations included the consideration whether a single disciplinary association could be asked to take over the case instead.

On April 1, 1915, Lovejoy, who had agreed to serve as secretary of the Association, was riding a train from Baltimore to New York when he purchased a copy of the New York Evening Post that reported on the dismissal of four and the resignation of fifteen professors at the University of Utah. It closed by noting, “It is fortunate that the professors have a newly organized national society to which to appeal.” Lovejoy decided to go to Utah to investigate in person and asked Dewey to advance funds to pay for his trip. A committee of inquiry, chaired by Seligman, was appointed after Lovejoy’s return. Over concerns that the investigation be considered impartial, Columbia education professor Henry Suzzalo was appointed as a “conservative” to the committee. He later resigned when he accepted the presidency of the University of Washington and went on to serve as president of the Carnegie Foundation.

With the need to act established, Dewey proposed to Seligman that “our Council appoint your
[Seligman’s] committee of nine in toto and then add, say, to its number from other lines of academic work. The your [sic] committee of nine would continue and report to the three associations constituting it while the committee of fifteen would be a committee of the Association of University Professors and report to them.61

Thus the first committee of the AAUP, the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, was born. It was frequently referred to as “the committee of fifteen” in order to keep it separate from the committee of nine, which continued to exist alongside it. Since Croly and Judson were ineligible to serve on the committee of fifteen, they were replaced with professors on the Association’s committee but remained on the committee of nine. Croly subsequently resigned when he concluded that he wanted to cover the Nearing case in the New Republic. It took until September for Dewey to appoint all of the members of the committee of fifteen. Among those appointed were Warren and Farnam.62

Early defenders of academic freedom reacted with consternation whenever professors accepted positions vacated by dismissals in violation of academic freedom, since this seemed to vindicate the offending administration. In an article in the Atlantic Monthly, for instance, Warren asked whether it was a breach of professional ethics for professors to “accept a chair from which a colleague has been removed without trial.” In a letter to Dewey at the end of April, Lovejoy observed, “You will see by the enclosed that the president of the University of Utah is stealing a march on us, in order to fill the vacancies in the faculty before our report is published. As the principal practical effect of the Association’s action in the case will consist in making good men disinclined to accept Utah positions in the present circumstances, I am not sure that we should not do well to go farther than we have yet done to forestall the efforts of Dr. Kingsbury and his traveling companion.”63

Consequently, by early June, several members of the investigative committee wrote a letter to the editor of The Nation providing a preliminary summary of the findings in the case.64

Lichtenberger, who served on the Utah committee, reported back to Ross, “We deliberated twelve and one half hours in Professor Seligman’s library on Sunday, May 16.” In the minutes that he prepared of that meeting, Lichtenberger noted that both President Kingsbury and Dean Gibson from the University of Utah, who happened to be in New York, spent an hour and a half with the committee. The final report was published in July. At eighty-two pages, the report is still among the most detailed ever produced by the Association.65

In the end, what is perhaps most striking about the committee’s investigative activities is the decidedly political evenhandedness with which it selected which cases to investigate: it picked three cases from Western state universities (Colorado, Montana, Utah), in one of which it sided against the complaining professor (Colorado); one case from a historically denominational, Carnegie-approved college (Wesleyan), in
which ostensibly religious matters played a role; and a Ross-like academic freedom case at a privately endowed institution (Pennsylvania). As the committee reported, it chose these five from eleven brought to its attention. Three of those eleven (Dartmouth, Oklahoma A&M, Tulane) were sent on to disciplinary organizations, even though reports on Dartmouth and Tulane were prepared by members of the committee but never published. Two cases not further identified by the committee were from Bryn Mawr and Baylor University.66

Two complaints involved university presidents, one who was dismissed (at the University of Montana) and one who complained about his governing board (at James Millikin University). Complaints over the dismissal of university presidents, who were ineligible for AAUP membership, created some difficulties for the committee. At Montana, other faculty had been dismissed as well, but the committee still attempted to involve the National Association of State Universities, which refused. In the case of Millikin, the committee declined to get involved.67

Declaration of Principles

In addition to the investigative work of the committee, it also produced the 1915 *Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure*. The report has two parts: The “General Declaration of Principles” and “Practical Proposals” regarding tenure and dismissals. The word general in the former was chosen by the committee to distinguish its work from that of the committee of nine, which had been charged with establishing principles of academic freedom specific to the social sciences.

The 1915 *Declaration* was based on a first draft written by Seligman using comments sent by each member of the committee. After a meeting over the Thanksgiving holiday, a subcommittee consisting of Seligman, Fetter, and Lovejoy wrote the report. Seligman frequently credited Lovejoy with important contributions to the report. The 1914 interim report of the committee of nine had listed multiple questions about academic freedom that the committee was unable to answer. In addition to adopting some of the conclusions of the interim report, the 1915 *Declaration* contained answers to many of the questions posed in the interim report.68

Without mentioning all the contributions that the 1915 *Declaration* made to the intellectual foundation of academic freedom, I will single out three for discussion.

The 1915 *Declaration* contained the famous statement that professors are the appointees but not the employees of trustees, comparing them to federal judges. An extension of that comparison, that academic freedom is akin to judicial immunity, was offered to the committee by Northwestern University law dean John Wigmore, who later served as second president of the AAUP. Given Lovejoy’s detailed disagreement,
the committee decided not to include Wigmore’s analysis in the report. Lovejoy’s objection to the analogy is of continuing relevance to discussions over the limits of academic freedom. He noted that giving complete immunity to professors in their area of competence would not permit the profession to uphold its standards. Giving immunity thus went too far. At the same time, since immunity was only to be extended to speech in their discipline, it didn’t go far enough to defend extramural speech. Lovejoy and Wigmore subsequently debated the proposal in The Nation.69

While the interim report specifically noted the differences between academic freedom violations in state universities and endowed institutions, it had not further attempted to unify the two under one conceptual framework. Participants in the debate over academic freedom found it vexing to find one conceptual framework for both kinds of institutions. For instance, Bemis wrote in 1900 that he did not think that it was possible, noting, “I hold that it is more important for a state university to encourage liberal teaching in economic and social lines than it is for a private college, because the latter is sustained by only one class in the community—wealthy donors—and the trustees, therefore, almost unconsciously are likely to adopt a class attitude while a state university should represent the whole people.”70 Ross, with a pragmatism that bordered on cynicism, observed, “The existence of the endowed university and the state university side by side is a good thing for academic freedom. In both there are dangers to the scholar’s independence, but they are not the same dangers; so that the scholar evicted from one may find refuge with the other.”71 Instead, the 1915 Declaration stated that the “nature of the trust reposed in the governing boards of the ordinary institutions of learning” was a public trust.

The trustees are trustees for the public. In the case of our state universities this is self-evident. In the case of most of our privately endowed institutions, the situation is really not different. They cannot be permitted to assume the proprietary attitude and privilege, if they are appealing to the general public for support. Trustees of such universities or colleges have no moral right to bind the reason or the conscience of any professor. All claim to such right is waived by the appeal to the general public for contributions and for moral support in the maintenance, not of a propaganda, but of a non-partisan institution of learning. It follows that any university which lays restrictions upon the intellectual freedom of its professors proclaims itself a proprietary institution, and should be so described whenever it makes a general appeal for funds; and the public should be advised that the institution has no claim whatever to general support or regard.72

Finally, the concern that those professors who hold conservative views may do so out of fear of reprisal by institutional authorities was directly addressed: “But it is highly needful, in the interest of society at large, that what purport to be the conclusions of men trained for, and dedicated to, the quest for truth, shall
in fact be the conclusions of such men, and not echoes of the opinions of the lay public, or of the individuals who endow or manage universities.” The report was unanimously approved at the second annual meeting on January 1, 1916.

The Reception of the 1915 Declaration

The goal of the Association was, of course, to have the principles espoused in the 1915 Declaration adopted as widely as possible. The AAUP sent copies of the report to university presidents and maintained a list of the responses they received. The comments from presidents ranged from criticism, to applause, to a promise by the president of the Ohio State University never to appoint another faculty member to a rank eligible for tenure.73

The Office of Education reported extensively on the founding of the AAUP and the academic freedom cases that had developed in its 1915 report. In the following year, the office not only discussed the investigations of the Association again at length and summarized the 1915 Declaration, but it also noted, “Both the representative and responsible character of the association which issues it, and the eminence of the men whose signatures are attached, would bespeak for the report in any event the careful consideration of university boards and executives. Its content, moreover, is worthy of its authors and its sponsor. It constitutes one of the most valuable contributions of the year to the discussion of educational policy. The pamphlet has already been widely distributed by the Bureau of Education among those concerned with the direction of higher education.”74 Thus, in addition to distribution by its members, the Association’s statement was being distributed by the US government in 1916.

The AAC had appointed the Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure in Office, which in its 1917 report criticized the 1915 Declaration severely. In addition to noting that the restrictions regarding membership in the Association excluded both presidents and those below the rank of professors, rendering the Association less than representative of the teaching profession, the AAC committee also held that most purported academic freedom cases were really just a matter of dealing with “vexels” or mischief-makers who “retard administrative processes.”75

Seligman sent the report to Henry Pritchett, whose secretary sent formal thanks. While the Carnegie Foundation had greeted the impending founding of the Association in its 1914 annual report, it did not remark on the 1915 Declaration in subsequent reports. Neither did the AAU, perhaps because it felt that the elite institutions it represented didn’t have problems with academic freedom.76

As Metzger noted, trying to get universities to adopt its principles campus-by-campus was eventually abandoned in favor of working with some of the very educational associations mentioned here.77
Aftermath

With the report of the committee approved, the committee of nine went out of existence. The Association’s committee had discharged its duties as well. According to the minutes of the second annual meeting, “The Chairman of the Committee, Professor Seligman, asking to be relieved of the duties of that position and suggesting the appointment of a new standing Committee on the subject, it was voted ‘that the present Committee be discharged after completion of their unfinished business, and that the Council be instructed to appoint a permanent Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure.’”78

In addition to this committee, AAUP president John Wigmore appointed a total of sixteen standing committees, several of which had been authorized as ad hoc committees the previous year. For the first time, standing committees were assigned letters to their names: Committee A, Committee B, and so on, a practice that Wigmore appears to have adopted from the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, which he had helped found at Northwestern. The charge of Committee A, stated in the 1916 Bulletin, was to “complete the work” of the joint committee.79

While Wigmore publicly praised the efforts of Committee A, he informed the Council that he wished to create a large number of committees so as to avoid the impression that the Association was solely interested in the defense of academic freedom: “The Association must exhibit to the public its real interest in the variety of topics that concern the profession of university teachers. As it is now, the public has formed the notion that the Association is concerned with only one thing, viz., grievances of professors against governing boards. . . . My conception of this body is that of a broad professional organization of university teachers, aiming to the solution of all professional problems. . . . On that conception, we are bound to take up as many as feasible of the subjects mentioned in the call for organization.”80

Wigmore’s concern may have been prompted by a report in The Nation that severely criticized the nascent state of the AAUP, noting, “The officers of the Association, whose industry and devotion no one could question, had apparently allowed themselves to become so engrossed with the issue of academic freedom as to leave them no time for proper consideration of the interests of the Association as a whole.”81

Seligman responded to the author’s criticism in a letter, stating, “The reason why so little attention was paid to other things was because in the judgment of Dewey, Lovejoy, and myself, this question of academic freedom had to be gotten out of the way first, and the officers therefore devoted all their time to this. Another year the situation will be very different.”82 The sense that the question was “gotten out of the way” indicates Seligman’s optimism that the issue of academic freedom could perhaps be addressed with some finality by the early work of the Association.
Nevertheless, on reviewing a list of the reports of committees that were published before 1949, it is apparent already then that only Committee A was able to maintain a regular level of activity. The Committee on the Limits of Standardization, for instance, existed for almost a decade and never issued a report. One committee appointed by Wigmore that did have significant impact was Committee P on pensions, which negotiated with the Carnegie Foundation over the creation of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA) in 1918 after the foundation proved unable to provide the level of pensions originally promised. During the first several years, Committee P was chaired by Columbia law professor and later Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court Harlan Stone. But on the whole, the Association’s main focus and its lasting accomplishments turned out to be related to the defense of academic freedom. In fact, as early as 1920, Lovejoy, in his presidential address, noted that “the maintenance of ‘academic freedom’ must be a perennial and essential part of the business of this Association. It is worthwhile to insist upon this anew, because one sometimes hears within the Association itself murmurings that ‘there has been too much talk about academic freedom.’ There can hardly be too much talk about it until the simple and fundamental principles above recapitulated . . . are recognized as axiomatic by all educated persons, especially by all who have anything to do with the management of universities.”

Thus, the Association’s course was set by events rather than by design and not without dissent.

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Notes
4 Lovejoy, “Profession of the Professorate,” 183, 186.
5 Ibid., 61.

8 Cattell, *University Control*, 18–19.


13 Ibid., 190.


19 See Metzger, *Academic Freedom in the Age of the University*, chap. 3.


22 Veysey, *Emergence of the American University*, 410.


29 Letter by Edward Ross to Theodore Schroeder, December 14, 1912, AAUP Archives, Lovejoy file.


39 On the Flexner Report, see Lagemann, *Private Power for the Public Good*, 66–74. On the financial interests represented on the governing board of the foundation, see Barrow, *Universities and the Capitalist State*, chap. 3. The reference to
Pritchett’s power is quoted in ibid., 89. Bryan’s quote is in Robert E. Knoll, *Prairie University: A History of the University of Nebraska* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 54.


41 On the founding of the AAC, see Hawkins, *Banding Together*, 16–17.


47 The institutional files of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching are in the Special Collections at Columbia University. Hereafter, they will be cited as CFAT. Regarding Pritchett’s views on state universities, see Theron F. Schlabach, *Pensions for Professors* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin for the Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1963).


49 Darrow claimed that his dismissal was based on his public advocacy for theosophy: CFAT, box 51, folder 4, series III. A. Zueblin’s case is interesting because Furner, for example, claims that by the administration did not restrict his academic freedom (Furner, *Advocacy and Objectivity*, 183). However, his file in the presidential archives, in particular letters by President Judson, provide evidence to the contrary, since they urge him to restrict his extramural activities. Zueblin resigned after receiving these letters. Zueblin’s file contains a letter to the *Memphis Scimitar* responding to reports that he had been fired. Letters from Harry P. Judson to Charles Zueblin, November 18 27, 1907; letter from D. A. Roberts, Secretary to the President, to Editor of the *Memphis Scimitar*, May 8, 1908; both in Office of the President, Harper, Judson, and Burton Administrations, Records, [Box 89, Folder 18], Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library. On Bemis at Kansas State, see Gelber, *University and the People*, 134–46.


52 The policy of the foundation in these matters was reported to its Executive Committee. See the minutes of the Executive Committee, May, 14, 1915, CFAT, box 2, folder 4, series Ia.
While all of the cases are identified as having been brought to the committee in 1915, the Wesleyan case, as discussed above, was brought to the joint committee of nine in 1914. The identification in the 1915 Declaration of one of the cases as coming from the University of Oklahoma is mistaken. Instead, according to the records of the committee, that case is the Hardee Chambliss case at Oklahoma A&M. E. R. A. Seligman to Arthur Lovejoy, April 19, 1915, Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman Papers, Box 4 (“Uncataloged Correspondence, 1913–14”), Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library. Later recollections by an attendee can be found in H. Carrington Lancaster, “Memories and Suggestions,” Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors 26 (April 1940): 217–23.


Letter by E. R. A. Seligman to Committee on Academic Freedom, March 16, 1915, Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman Papers, Box 4 (“Uncataloged Correspondence, 1913–14”), Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library (Multiple letters from 1915 are filed in “Uncataloged Correspondence, 1913–14”); letter from Howard C. Warren to E. R. A. Seligman, February 20, 1915, Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman Papers, Cataloged Correspondence, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library.


Letter from John Dewey to E. R. A. Seligman, March 26, 1915, Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman Papers, Cataloged Correspondence, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library.


Ibid. Letter from E. R. A. Seligman to Committee on Academic Freedom, June 24, 1915, AAUP, 1913–18, reel 1, folder “Nearing.”


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Material on the George Fellows case at the James Millikin University is in AAUP, 1913–18, reel 1, folder “Aug. 20, 1914–June 9, 1915.” Regarding the request to involve the National Association of State Universities, see letter by Arthur Lovejoy to E. R. A. Seligman, September 11, 1915, AAUP, 1913–18, reel 1, folder “Montana Case, Folder 2.”


Edward Bemis, letter to the editor, Gantton’s Magazine, March 1900, 226.

Edward Alsworth Ross, Changing America (New York: Century, 1912), 203.

AAUP, Policy Documents and Reports, 293.

Letter from John Wigmore to Harry P. Judson, May 1, 1916, Office of the President, Harper, Judson, and Burton Administrations, Records, box 5, folder 10, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library. For a list of responses by university presidents, see AAUP, 1913–18, reel 3, folder “Reports, 1914–1917, Folder 1.”


