Lost in Post–Cold War Transitions: The Limits of Freedom in Scholarship

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Abstract

The central question addressed in this essay is whether there are justifiable limits to freedom in science and scholarship. The question is further specified to deal with social sciences (including humanities) in the “transitional period” that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Paying attention to the historical context and sociological facts on the ground, the essay considers an “ethics of research” as falling within a larger endeavor of developing first an ethics of international activism that formulates a series of constraints on what would constitute morally permissible agency when delivering services abroad, directly or indirectly, and other activities. Relying on a key conceptual distinction between “activism in scholarship” and “activism with scholarship,” the essay proposes a way to think about justifiable limits to freedom in scholarship, using as its example the field of “transitional justice” studies.

When considering the question of the importance of freedom for scientific development, scholars inevitably emphasize the essential value of academic freedom (or freedom of research) for achieving progress in any area of science, but in particular in the social sciences and humanities. In this essay I want to consider things from the opposite angle and ask whether there might be justifiable limits to freedom in science. This project is normative in character; in other words, it proposes ways current practices or understandings can be assessed and possibly improved. It is limited in that it will deal only with the social sciences (including the humanities) in the “transitional period.” While, geographically speaking, the term transition applies vaguely to the processes that took place in the countries of Eastern Europe (including, of course, the post-Yugoslav
lands) after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, we should bear in mind that the scholarship on the theme of “transition” was developed entirely in the West. The character of the works on this general theme is such that when we take a look at what passes for scholarship in this novel “discipline” of transitional justice, the question about the limits of freedom in scholarship invites serious considerations of whether scholarship could retain its symbolic capital if the academic field it belongs to were stripped of its autonomy.

A peculiar phenomenon emerged in the post–Cold War period: nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) became the main drivers of international activism. An unexpected by-product of this social change on a global scale was the increased collaboration between scholars (scientific laborers) and these NGOs. This unlikely fusion of starkly different social players is facilitated by the fact that international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) share with researchers and scholars (who in the West increasingly must rely on grant money for survival) the same sources of funding (large private philanthropic foundations, Western governments, and corporate foundations). Furthermore, given that in this joint venture scholars have been reduced to a supporting role, properly construed, the normative project undertaken here would require that we separate the question about the moral characteristics of “international activism” from the question about the eventual need to place moral (and perhaps even legal) limits on the freedom of activism in scholarship. However, given the historical context and sociological facts on the ground, the project of thinking about an “ethics of research” falls within a larger endeavor of developing first an “ethics of international activism.” Elsewhere I have done the latter, and here I will rely only on some relevant aspects of that construct that will be helpful for developing a sketch of an ethics of scholarship and research.

Before I continue, I’d like to say a word about the field of “transitional justice,” which will serve here as the primary example of the kind of work in the social sciences that might require that we place limits on freedom of scholarship, or so I will argue. We observe international activists urging states in transition to deal with their recent violent past; at the same time, scholars offer to develop a theoretical background for those demands. The issue of reckoning with past wrongs has in one way or another taken central stage in many a narrative from various disciplines that suddenly surfaced in great numbers after the end of Cold War. These efforts quickly took shape of a new multidisciplinary field of study, and the name chosen for it was “transitional justice.” A cursory look at the scholarly production after a few decades reveals the underlying assumption present in these works: that a moral imperative exists requiring collectives marked by the experience of recent violence—in particular mass atrocities, war crimes, or genocide—to “come to terms” with it. While in each case it may be open for discussion which one of many processes—be they criminal trials, truth and reconciliation hearings (the conventional term is “commissions”), amnesties, or some combination of these—best suits any given situation, doing nothing (or very little) is highly discouraged.

The demands of justice, we are told, foreclose inaction, and the more serious and extreme the experience
of violence, the less acceptable it seems to do nothing about it. While this may be a natural attitude for anyone to have, it must also be recognized that the primary proponents and most forceful promoters of “transitional justice” are the United States and its Western European allies. Hence the increased internationalization of the processes of transitional justice, which resulted, for example, in the creation of new law-like bodies such as ad hoc international tribunals (the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY] and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR]), the International Criminal Court (ICC), or the ever-more massive deployment around the globe of INGOs. It could even be reasonably alleged that the discourse of “transitional justice” originated in the West and was then imposed on the rest the world. For example, the very idea of “transitional justice” was introduced in the countries of Eastern Europe through the vast network of nonprofit organizations connected to the Open Society Foundations funded by the hedge-fund manager George Soros and the activities sponsored by the US Agency for International Development in those countries. In other words, “transitional justice” as an export item has become an important element of Western foreign policy, in particular that of the United States.4

Given that my argument seeking to justify placing specific limits on freedom of research depends on the framework of a larger theoretical proposal involving international activism, I will first outline my argument’s theoretical foundation.

Ethics of International Activism
The increasing power of INGOs, manifest in their ever-mounting operations and their handling of ever-more substantial amounts of money, raises questions about the roles and responsibilities of such global, nonstate actors. Do we need, in other words, an ethics of international activism that would facilitate moral assessments of endeavors undertaken by agents in countries other than their own? The approach I took in developing an ethics of international activism involved formulating a series of constraints on what would constitute morally permissible agency in a context that includes delivering services abroad, directly or indirectly. In elaborating these ethical constraints I relied on the concept of the “force multiplier.” This idea and its official applications is important when considering the correlation between the phenomenal growth in the number of international NGOs since end of the Cold War and the concomitant emergence of the United States as the sole, unchallenged superpower in the new “unipolar” world.

The proposal for an “ethics of international activism” consists of four constraints on morally permissible international activism: (C1) the Professionalism Constraint; (C2); the Integrity Constraint; (C3) the Respect for Sovereignty Constraint; and (C4) the Humility Constraint. As soon as these constraints are understood and analyzed, an overarching principle emerges that gives local activism primacy in all three normative spheres (moral, legal, and political) over international activism. At the same time, this gives us an idea of how
to conceive of what could constitute legitimate international activism, that is, one that respects the primacy of local activism.

Since the first two constraints (the Professionalism Constraint and the Integrity Constraint) and the concept of the “force multiplier” will be also relevant for developing the argument for placing limits on the freedom of research, I will briefly introduce these ideas, after defining what I mean by “international activist.”

International activists are altruists attracted by causes that originate in foreign lands. Consequently, these are foreign altruists. By calling them “altruists,” I do not intend to prejudge the actions of international activists as necessarily morally good; I simply mean to indicate that they are ostensibly acting out of concern for the welfare of others; in this case, those others are foreigners. This characterization is quite consistent with the rather confused and misguided nature of many activities stemming from one’s concern for the well-being of others, even to the point that some altruistic acts may be judged as morally bad—this may take the form of further victimizing those who are already suffering as a result of, say, civil strife. Furthermore, this does not preclude a person from joining an organization that is part of the activism industry for essentially selfish reasons: one may be moved on egoistic grounds to make a living from activism.

We can make further progress in identifying more exactly who the “international activists” are by making more precise this notion of “causes that originate in foreign lands.” Most frequently those causes are expressed in terms of global protection and respect for human rights. Thus, Amnesty International defines itself as “a worldwide movement of people who campaign for internationally recognized human rights to be respected and protected for everyone,”5 while Human Rights Watch states that it “is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world.”6

Additional clarity is achieved when we realize that governments can be interested in issues that might be expressed in terms of human rights but that we nonetheless would not count government administrators, operating in their official capacities, among “international activists.” Thus, although the US Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor claims that “protecting human rights around the world [is] central to US foreign policy,”7 we would not consider State Department officials “international activists.” This is why organizations that want to count as groupings of international activists are quick to assert their independence. Thus Human Rights Watch’s self-description emphasizes that it is “one of the world’s leading independent organizations dedicated to defending and protecting human rights,”8 while Amnesty International makes the same claim using more precise language, affirming that it is “independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion.”9 Consequently, international activists are not meant to be government officials, ideologues, corporate lobbyists, or missionaries on behalf of any religion; in fact, international activists are supposed to operate independently of any government, ideology, corporation, or religion. In the first instance, this then poses strong constraints on how to construe an ethics of
international activism: “(C1) It is considered morally impermissible for international activists to act on behalf of any government, ideology, corporation, or religion.”

Let us call this the \textit{Professionalism Constraint}. It stands to reason that if people are genuinely motivated by the welfare of others from a country other than their own, then they must not be acting on behalf of their (or any other) government, should not promote any ideology (political, economic, or otherwise), nor proselytize in favor of a religion. While one may believe that one is helping someone by getting them to accept the “true” God, the “best” political arrangement, the most “efficient” economic structure, or the “fairest” conception of the \textit{sumum bonum}, none of these initiatives could be said to stem merely from the motive of acting on behalf of the other’s welfare, as the definition of “international activist” adopted here requires. Thus, for example, international activists must not propagate in favor of a regime change in a country where such policy is pursued by, say, the US government; they must not promote the economic ideology of the free market and privatization in, say, a country with a socialist economic system (or any other); or attempt to convert, say, the local Muslim population to Christianity. This much can therefore be asserted with sufficient clarity to make our first constraint on an ethics of international activism fairly straightforward and uncontroversial. It is another matter, in fact an empirical matter, whether activists from Western countries in general manage to live up to this clear moral requirement.

If our goal is both to construct a framework for an ethics of international activism, through a process of formulating applicable moral constraints on what constitutes permissible conduct in this context, and to engage in the making of concrete moral judgments about actual endeavors that take place throughout the world, then we must attend to the existing vocabulary of the “aid discourse.” In other words, an effort to be both theoretical (developing an aspect of moral philosophy) and practical (using the conceptual tools for normative judgment making) must keep track of relevant real-life experiences, in the best tradition of applied ethics.

This brings us to the second notion that I utilized in building the ethics of international activism, the concept of the \textit{force multiplier}. It is a military term, defined as follows: “A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.”

Readers might be tempted to think, at this point, that something must have gone terribly wrong. Isn’t the notion of “force multiplier” obviously inconsistent with the contents of our first constraint, the Professionalism Constraint, on the morally permissible domain of activities by international activists? How could this latter idea even be contemplated in connection to international activism? Yet the link exists, and it is a very strong one, as then–US secretary of state Colin Powell made clear in 2001:
As I speak, just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom. . . . I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team. . . . [We are] all committed to the same, singular purpose to help humankind, to help every man and woman in the world who is in need, who is hungry, who is without hope, to help every one of them fill a belly, get a roof over their heads, educate their children, have hope, give them the ability to dream about a future that will be brighter, just as we have tried to make the future brighter for all Americans.\textsuperscript{11}

For anyone who is not onboard with an American mission to do good in the world (as the United States understands it), there will be something disturbing in the suggestion that international activists, or even UN workers, should serve as force multipliers for US armed forces in the variety of theaters of operations where the latter are continuously active. This stands in direct opposition to the definitional component of “international activism” as agency that stems from concern for the welfare of others in foreign countries. The integrity of their actions is threatened if international activists operate in concert with US armed forces or for the sake of the US government while ostensibly engaged in addressing the basic needs of less fortunate humans in other countries. Consequently, an explicit moral constraint defining the way international activists can satisfy the requirements of minimal integrity of their actions is necessary. Call it the Integrity Constraint: “(C2) It is considered morally impermissible for international activists to serve as force multipliers for US armed forces or the US government.”

It is perhaps clear that the Integrity Constraint is implied by our Professionalism Constraint. However, given the way US officials embrace international activists as force multipliers, the impact of the phenomenon of revolving doors, and the apparent happy acquiescence by many international activists to their newly given (post–Cold War) role, it is important to make the Integrity Constraint explicit.

Ethics of Scholarship

Equipped with the two constraints on morally permissible international activism, and keeping in mind the practically useful concept of the “force multiplier,” we can now turn to a similar proposal that will apply to the question of what constitutes permissible scholarship, specifically in the context of “transitional justice studies.” It turns out that when these constraints are combined with a sensible distinction that can be made between the two kinds of activism scholars can engage in, we have all the ingredients we need for a suitable ethics of scholarship, which sets the limits on freedom of activism within scholarship. The distinction in question is based on the work of the French sociologist and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu.

I want to introduce here a distinction between “activism in scholarship” and “activism with scholarship.”
As we shall see, there are reasons to raise moral objections against the former type of practice, as it leads to findings and recommendations based not on proper methodology or correct facts but instead on ideological grounds, or on conventional wisdom or standard narratives. To crystalize this distinction we can take into account Bourdieu himself, as someone who not only theorized the concept but is perhaps the best example of someone who practiced “activism with scholarship” while rejecting “activism in scholarship” as heteronomous and irresponsible. He articulated and modeled the role of the “committed scientist” or “public intellectual.” In order to count as intellectuals, “cultural producers”—seen by Bourdieu as “bi-dimensional beings”—must satisfy two conditions. First, they “must belong to an intellectually autonomous field, one independent of religious, political, economic or other powers, and they must respect that field’s particular laws,” which means that the questions they ask, problems they formulate, and methods they use to seek answers must be recognized de facto as belonging to the field by its practitioners. Second, “they must deploy their specific expertise and authority in their particular intellectual domain in a political activity outside it.”

In other words, for Bourdieu, the proper engagement of a scholar or intellectual is outside academia but relying on the tools of his or her specialization to accomplish political interventions.

The former condition spells out the existence of autonomous fields as the foundation of symbolic authority, which, when exercised outside scholarship or academia, as interventions in politics, per the later condition, represents the proper domain of civil engagement for intellectuals equipped with scientifically obtained knowledge. The concept of autonomy is fundamental to Bourdieu’s thinking about scholarly (or any other) writing in different fields, because it is through a historical process of separation from external influences (autonomization) and development of field-specific methodologies (differentiation) that fields become constituted. When focusing on the literary field as an example, Bourdieu saw this process as leading to the constitution of the dispositions characteristic of the “pure” writer, motivated by literary ends alone, for the first time, according to him, exemplified in Emile Zola. Bourdieu marks the late nineteenth century as the time when the French literary field achieved high autonomy separating almost totally its cultural power from the state and the market. It is precisely Zola’s intervention in the Dreyfus affair that for Bourdieu marked the high point of autonomy in the French literary field. Thus Bourdieu endeavored to keep scholarly methodology rigorous and free from all external interests, be they economic or political. Bourdieu’s own activism was motivated by his belief that “those who have the good fortune to be able to devote their lives to the study of the social world cannot stand aside, neutral and indifferent, from the struggles in which the future of that world is at stake.”

He argued that his theorizing of habitus, field, and symbolic power gave him greater understanding of the institutions he sought to influence. He developed a view of multinational corporations, international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and the United States as together
embodying “the cunning of imperialist reason”14 in an international situation in which “the global community has given carte blanche to the U.S. to enforce a particular kind of order” in which “relations of force overwhelmingly favor the dominant” and “might alone makes right.”15 Thus his engagement based on the findings of his research included his many appeals and protests in Le Monde Diplomatique and appearances at rallies and demonstrations, where he spoke against the government’s neoliberal strategies of welfare cuts and immigration policies, as well as complicit journalism.16 This is “activism with scholarship” in its most robust form. But we must remember that Bourdieu did not see this as a solitary effort. Instead he encouraged “all competent researchers to unite their efforts with those of responsible activists in order to collectively discuss and elaborate a set of analyses and proposals for progress that today exist only in the virtual state of private and isolated thoughts or circulate in fringe publications, confidential reports, or esoteric journals.”17 At the same time, Bourdieu rejected “activism in scholarship” as a threat to autonomy, for its presence in any field signals dependence with regard to external economic, political, or religious powers, which erodes any symbolic authority necessary for proper civic engagement by an intellectual. As such it also represents a kind of incompetence as a violation of the basic value of all authentic scholarship, its “interest in disinterestedness.” Thus, when Bourdieu called for full adherence to scholarship of “the collective intellectual,” he was envisioning “an improbable but indispensable combination: scholarship with commitment, that is, a collective politics of intervention in the political field that follows, as much as possible, the rules that govern the scientific field.” This Bourdieusian account gives us a clear sense of the dual failure of “activism in scholarship” that amounts to pseudoscholarship (because it lacks autonomy) and fake activism (as it is neither collective nor universal).

The Limits of Freedom in Scholarship

When it develops in a kind of symbiosis (through joint funders) with the work of INGOs, much of what passes for scholarship in the West, if considered carefully, would have to be classified as “activism in scholarship” and hence qualify as inappropriate, morally (and certainly methodologically) impermissible activity for a scholar. Further, we can say that “activism in scholarship” violates both the Professionalism Constraint and the Integrity Constraint, by making those who practice it “force multipliers” for the powers that be.

Of course, in the limited space available here this finding cannot be demonstrated by considering the entire “international justice” literature, so an example must suffice to show how these considerations might be applied in concrete cases of scholarship in this field.

Take, for instance, the questions regarding the fate of Yugoslavia within “transitional justice” (scholarly) discourse: What happened to this state—Yugoslavia—that was in existence for more than seven decades?
Who ended it and in what way? What role did international law play in achieving the final outcome? And what might be the source, significance, and purpose behind the international legal and historical narratives produced in the West regarding Yugoslavia’s disappearance?

These are broad questions and represent only the outer limits of the general theme. Still, on the question of what happened to Yugoslavia, we can discern two broad categories of answers. In the ever-growing, generally unanimous, and quite repetitive literature on this question (including endlessly recurring pronouncements by politicians or activists in the media, and unfortunately substantially absorbed in Western scholarship), the dominant view without any doubt is that Yugoslavia fell apart once various internal contradictions could no longer be kept under control. Call this the “self-destruction of Yugoslavia” account of what brought this state to the end. The competing account of how the state of Yugoslavia ceased to exist focuses on the emergence, in the post–Cold War period, of the agency of a single, unchallenged superpower: the United States of America. Call this the “the Hegemon did it” account of how Yugoslavia was dismantled.

Given that the principal mission of any true scholarship is to challenge fictions and fabrications, in this case about the sources of violence in the Balkans during the twentieth century, and promote accurate history (here, of Yugoslavia and Serbia), this and other contributions will argue in favor of the latter and against the former approach to answering the question about the way Yugoslavia went out of existence as a state.

A similar polarization can be identified between two camps offering answers to a related question: What role did international law (or appeals to it by the powerful states) play in Yugoslavia’s endgame? On the one side are those who offer encouraging accounts of the reform of international law as a result of attempts to be creative in its application to the events in 1990s Yugoslavia; on the other side are those argue that it was precisely the instrumentalization of international law (and the United Nations) by the sole superpower that doomed Yugoslavia. Already, very early in the 1990s, and throughout that decade, Yugoslavia became a veritable playground for testing various policies of the phantom “international community” (often used euphemistically to refer to the United States), inevitably justified in terms of applying (often novel forms of) international law (typically through various UN resolutions). These policies were in reality social experiments on a grand scale, and they ranged from an early imposition of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia in the name of “human rights” to the seventy-eight-day humanitarian bombing of the country by NATO in 1999.

A vast literature developed in support of these initiatives by scholars, activists, and activist-scholars, who see positive reform of international law as the end result. Call this position “reformist optimism.” A much more modest number of scholars, whose voices are almost drowned out, have struck cautionary notes that these “reforms,” rather than moving things in positive direction, in fact debase any decent conception of law (including international law). Call this position “traditionalist realism.” The contrast between reformist optimism and traditionalist realism cannot be overstated. For example, while proponents of the former
position view state sovereignty as a relic of a bygone era and praise globalization (no surprise, then, that on the question of what happened to Yugoslavia, they all adhere to the “self-destruction” theory), advocates of the latter perspective insist on the values of sovereignty and caution against predatory globalization (no surprise there either if we learn that they find the “the Hegemon did it” theory more plausible). But the greatest disparity between the two views lies in the steadfast refusal of traditionalist realism to endorse the reckless and purposeful confusion of moral sentiments and narratives for expertise in international law (particularly international criminal law) peddled by reformist optimists. Nowhere has this contrast come into so sharp a focus as with respect to exactly opposite opinions regarding legality, legitimacy, and justification for erecting ad hoc criminal tribunals (such as the ICTY and ICTR). Thus, a typical reformist optimist “reasoning” on this matter is formulated by a philosopher and lawyer interested in the ethics of international affairs: “When an international tribunal is set up to address mass murder or ethnic cleansing perpetrated by members of a State against fellow members of the same State, a relatively new form of international law is put on the table. This is the most controversial forum for international law. It is the most controversial because it implies that there are international normative standards that govern how States act within their own borders, and toward their own subjects.”

Pronouncements like this are ubiquitous in what passes for scholarship on international criminal law since the end of Cold War; perhaps what explains how a clear non sequitur like this can get by editors of even most prestigious university presses is the fact that this idea sounds so familiar to everyone involved, despite its total absence of intellectual merit. By contrast, any traditionalist realist would be quick to point out that the fact that an “international” tribunal has been set up implies nothing about the existence of international standards. The opposite, however, may be the case: if such standards existed, then it could be legitimate (and perfectly legal) to erect international criminal tribunals, assuming of course the mise en force of a binding treaty or the consent of the country whose criminal jurisdiction is thereby subsumed by international law. As things stand, it is a mistake to infer that international standards of justice are real because some states on the UN Security Council (contrary to the statutory mandate of that institution) managed to create international ad hoc “tribunals” (like the ICTY and ICTR). The logical implication goes exactly the other way round: if such standards existed, then there might have been nothing controversial about setting up such tribunals.

The “the Hegemon did it” perspective extends well beyond the destruction of Yugoslavia as its initial plausible application. “Humanitarian bombing,” carried out in violation of international law, edged the world toward an apparent decriminalization of aggression, the “supreme international crime,” according to the Nuremberg Tribunal. The euphemistic “use of force” in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya continues to be the object of justification in the name of democracy, human rights, the war on terrorism, the struggle against impunity, the responsibility to protect, and the necessity to never again permit genocide to be committed, and
the like. Yet putting an end (precisely) to the very use of force in international relations—in particular when carried out in violation of international law—was the essential raison d’être of the establishment of the United Nations, and lies at the heart of its charter.

As this example of the research themes dealing with the destruction of Yugoslavia, certainly among the more characteristic ones in early goings of “transitional justice,” indicates much of the production on this topic would qualify as “activism in scholarship” in Bourdieu’s classification, while at the same time it clearly violates The Constraint of Professionalism and The Constraint of Integrity. Such “research” without a doubt surpasses the boundaries of freedom consistent with proper scholarship.

In conclusion, we can see that the limits of freedom in scholarship can be understood in terms of two boundaries: first, one must avoid engaging in “activism in scholarship,” and, second, one must avoid being a “force multiplier.” The former is justified in terms of the demand to preserve the autonomy of one’s scholarly field, while the latter is the result of the demand for integrity of scholarly work.

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Notes
1 This essay is based on material prepared for the conference “Science and Freedom” organized by the Philosophical Faculty of East Sarajevo to be held in Pale, Republika Srpska, May 16–19, 2014. Unfortunately, the conference had to be canceled because of massive floods in many parts of the western Balkans. An earlier version of the essay was published in the Sociological Yearbook 9 (2014), published by the Sociological Society of the Republika Srpska.
2 Emphasis added. See http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/814581468739240860/pdf/multi-page.pdf, which states: “The number of international NGOs alone is reported to have increased from 6,000 in 1990 to 26,000 in 1999,” while “the OECD reports that in 2003, at least $12 billion was channeled into development assistance through the international agencies.”
7 See the bureau’s website, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ (last accessed February 10, 2014).
8 See the website from note 5; emphasis added.
9 See the website from note 4; emphasis added.
11 See Colin L. Powell, “Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Non-Governmental Organizations,” State Department, Washington, DC, October 26, 2001, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/powell_brief31.asp; emphasis added. In my essay “Go Local,” I offer many examples of individuals from various constituencies (government officials, journalists, NGO workers, UN officials,
think thank blog writers, and scholars) using this concept in a variety of contexts while discussing “international justice.”

16 More than a decade after his death, given the predicament France and Europe are currently in, all of these initiatives undertaken by Bourdieu seem particularly relevant. This article offers a philosophical application of specific conceptualizations by the theoretician from a cognate discipline of sociology.
17 Bourdieu, Firing Back, 15.
18 Larry May, Crimes against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 15