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## Opportunities of Our Own Making: The Struggle for “Academic Freedom”

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### Abstract

This essay examines David Horowitz’s “Academic Freedom” campaign, specifically exploring how “academic freedom,” a narrative that appears alongside “free speech” discourse frequently since September 11, 2001, can be understood as a site of struggle, a privileged label that grants legitimacy to those controlling it. This analysis includes public debates, interviews, and blog postings spanning the 2003 launch of Horowitz’s campaign, discussions of the proposed legislation in 2007, and his publication in 2009 of *One-Party Classroom*. By exposing the various ways Horowitz’s campaign is framed in the media by interested parties, I demonstrate how the link between “academic freedom” and “free speech” becomes a rhetorical strategy by which we can gain political and economic legitimacy.

A recent Harvard study indicates that many young people have yet to become involved in politics not because they are uninterested, but because they have yet to be given the opportunity.

—“The 15th Biannual Youth Survey on Politics and Public Service,” Institute of Politics at Harvard University, 2008

On March 4, 2010, young people were given an opportunity. After months of organizing, “hundreds of thousands took part in what was the largest day of coordinated student protest in years.”

<sup>1</sup> College and university campuses across the United States became sites of marches, strikes, teach-ins, and walkouts. The “Day of Action” was organized by the California Coordinating Committee in the hopes of

becoming “an historic turning point in the struggle against the cuts, layoffs, fee hikes, and the re-segregation of public education.”<sup>2</sup> *Democracy Now!* host Amy Goodman describes the scenes across the nation:

At the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, police used pepper spray to break up a student protest organized by Students for a Democratic Society. Fifteen students were arrested. At SUNY Purchase in New York protesters took over the Student Services Building. Students at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill staged a sit-in at the chancellor’s office. In Washington State, the Olympia Coalition for a Fair Budget held a mock funeral for public education and healthcare and brought a coffin to the state Capitol building. And in New York City, students and teachers at the City University of New York rallied outside Governor David Paterson’s office.<sup>3</sup>

The demonstrations seemed to awaken a new generation to the power of youth harnessed by students of previous decades, like those in the Free Speech Movement and the civil rights protests of the sixties, those leading antiwar demonstrations of the seventies, and those marching against South African apartheid in the eighties.

History reveals the myriad ways students have organized to demand civil rights.<sup>4</sup> The word *revolution* fell easily off the lips of students past. Max Elbaum explains, “For several years after 1968, additional upheavals increased the numbers and the resolve of the young revolutionaries. Richard Nixon’s doomed efforts to win the war in Southeast Asia led directly to the debacle of his May 1970 invasion of Cambodia, which resulted in the biggest explosion on US college campuses in history. A few months afterwards, the *New York Times* reported that four out of ten college students—nearly three million people—thought a revolution was necessary in the US.”<sup>5</sup> While present-day student political engagement might seem to have petered out, one need only look to more contemporary student-led demonstrations across the country—from the 2009 cafeteria sit-in at NYU to the 2010 nationwide, California-initiated walkout—to realize that it is far from dead.<sup>6</sup>

College campuses remain an important site of political and ideological struggle.<sup>7</sup> Students have provided and can continue to provide political organizations and movements with significant members, resources, and leaders both before and long after graduation. So how might rhetoric be used to facilitate or obstruct student participation in political and social affairs? I explore this question by focusing on one particular discourse I believe is central to the quality of university life (and consequently student life), that of academic freedom. This essay is an attempt to understand how the struggle to control the discourse of academic freedom is a struggle over the rhetorical disciplining of political engagement on college campuses. Specifically, in this essay I focus on the fight to frame public perception of “academic freedom,” a term that, at least since September 11, 2001, appears frequently with “free speech.” I believe that “academic freedom” functions as a contextualized iteration of “free speech” to chill faculty and student speech while

simultaneously discrediting university and college campuses as legitimate spaces for political engagement. Ultimately I argue that the capacity of a rhetor like David Horowitz to use “academic freedom” in such a way as to make the concept mean its opposite—the policing of free thought on campuses—reveals the malleability of the term and becomes the ultimate example of the ideological nature of the “free speech” trope.

To make this argument, this essay will begin with a diachronic analysis of “academic freedom” by tracing the term’s historical development and its eventual merge with “free speech.” Next, I will offer a textual analysis of the modern conception of “academic freedom” in the contemporary discursive debate between David Horowitz, the founder of the Academic Bill of Rights legislative campaign, and his critics. This analysis will include public debates, interviews, and blog postings spanning the 2003 launch of Horowitz’s campaign for “academic freedom,” the contemporary discussions of the proposed legislation in 2007, and his coauthored book in 2009, *One-Party Classroom*.<sup>8</sup> While I will include textual analysis of Horowitz’s rhetoric, my primary interest is the political climate he is capable of fostering because of the rhetorical connection between “academic freedom” and “free speech.” Consequently, I will include an analysis of how Horowitz is framed in public debates by other interested parties. How do academics, administrators, parents, students, and politicians ignore, refute, or confront Horowitz’s Academic Bill of Rights?

The cost of efforts like Horowitz’s, as we will explore in this essay, is the chilling of the university as a space not just for the free exploration of ideas but also for the prospect of faculty and student political engagement. National and international university and college professors are already fighting this threat. Legal scholar William Van Alstyne explains, “Gradually, the phrase [academic freedom] slipped away from a close association with protection of the academic in his professional endeavors and assumed a new synonymy with the general civil liberties of academics (and especially their general *political* liberties).”<sup>9</sup> Fritz Machlup reports the situation in the new *Encyclopedia of Higher Education*: “Academic freedom (in its modern conception, though not in the past) includes the right of the academic to engage in political activity.”<sup>10</sup> Although this might initially seem a desirable inclusion for most faculty, Van Alstyne notes the problems that arise because of the union between “academic freedom” and “free speech”: “The wooden insistence that academic freedom is at the heart of an academic’s right to engage in political activity has repeatedly drawn the sharp riposte that, given this rationale, the political liberties of academics must be correspondingly reviewed by a higher standard (i.e., a professional standard) than the like activities of others.”<sup>11</sup> As I will discuss, because the concept was created before the First Amendment applied to all the states, “academic freedom” was designed to protect faculty—conceived of by many in professional and legal organizations as the vanguards of democracy—to be critical of public policy and opinion. In other words, “academic freedom” was a rhetorical strategy designed

to protect faculty members in their critical pursuits by keeping the concept separate and distinct from “free speech.” However, Van Alstyne argues, as First Amendment rights evolved in the judicial system, the political engagement of faculty members came to be judged with greater scrutiny, even hostility, than the political engagement of nonacademic citizens. Although the definition of “academic freedom” has been controversial, conflating the concept with “free speech” has saddled “academic freedom” with the same ambiguity, malleability, and historical turmoil inherent in “free speech.” As “academic freedom” becomes a contextualized iteration of “free speech,” academics are suspect to persecution under one category when engaging in the other.

### “ACADEMIC FREEDOM” AS A LIBERAL NARRATIVE

The goals of academic freedom are:

- A. To promote inquiry and advance the sum of human knowledge.
- B. To provide general instruction to the students.
- C. To develop experts for various branches of the public service.

—AAUP, “1915 Declaration of Principles”

Originating in Germany, “academic freedom” evolved from three interrelated principles: *Lehrfreiheit*, *Lernfreiheit*, and *Freiheit der Wissenschaft*. These German roots are important because they have developed and evolved into our contemporary understanding of “academic freedom.” Roughly translated, these terms provided professors with the freedom to teach, students with the freedom to learn, and the academy with the freedom to govern itself.<sup>12</sup> In an attempt to insulate themselves from the influence and control of both the state and the church, German educational institutions “fashioned a partnership between state and professoriate in which the latter held the stronger hand.”<sup>13</sup> Historian Walter Metzger explains,

The German full professors could elect their own administrators, appoint instructors supported by student fees, and submit short lists of nominees for vacant chairs to the ministers of education. But the power to establish new professorships, fix the scale of faculty compensation, reject faculty nominees for high appointments, or even act against junior faculty members charged with political radicalism rested with the distant ministerial authority. . . . The idea that institutional autonomy was indispensable to academic freedom would be widely disseminated under the German label and would survive increasingly realistic accounts of how that system really worked.<sup>14</sup>

Consequently, the extent to which contemporary understandings of “academic freedom” existed in the historical context from which the concept originated is arguably quite little.

Regardless, in the late nineteenth century, American graduates returned from postgraduate work at German institutions with the promising narrative of “academic freedom” on their lips.<sup>15</sup> So seemingly natural was this narrative that when the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure was formed in 1915, AAUP president John Dewey commented, “The defense of academic freedom and tenure being already a concern of the existing learned societies will not, I am confident, be more than an incident in the activities of the Association in developing professional standards.”<sup>16</sup> Within the year of its first American defining, eleven complaints of academic freedom infringements were filed with the Association. Considering it an anomaly, Dewey reasoned, “Investigations of particular cases were literally thrust upon us.”

Between 1925 and 1940, the AAUP initiated a series of conferences with the Association American Colleges (AAC) in efforts to accommodate the continual development of unanticipated historical and cultural “thrusts.” In their joint *1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure*, the AAUP and AAC reiterated what they considered to be the natural and legitimate place of academic freedom in institutions of higher education: “Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and applies to both teaching and research. Freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth.”<sup>17</sup> Dewey assured members that while “conditions shape themselves for us,” those who had labored on the cases of academic freedom had “enhanced the security and dignity of the scholar’s calling throughout our country.”<sup>18</sup>

Dewey’s confidence in the attainment of a stable understanding of “academic freedom” reflects the belief in the university as the natural and legitimate vanguard of democracy. The cloistered walls of the university are naturally analogous to the liberal privileging of the marketplace of ideas. The AAUP explains,

The tendency of modern democracy is for men to think alike, to feel alike, and to speak alike. Any departure from the conventional standards is apt to be regarded with suspicion. Public opinion is at once the chief safeguard of a democracy, and the chief menace to the real liberty of the individual. . . . One of its most characteristic functions in a democratic society is to help make public opinion more self-critical and more circumspect, to check the more hasty and unconsidered impulses of popular feeling, to train the democracy to the habit of looking before and after. . . . [A *true* university] should be an intellectual experiment station, where new ideas may germinate and where their fruit, though still distasteful to the community as a whole, may be allowed to ripen until finally, perchance, it may become part of the accepted intellectual food of the nation or of the world.<sup>19</sup>

Such sentiment took hold in legal dicta over the next few decades. When the Supreme Court first addressed “academic freedom” in 1952, it arose following a rash of accusations that professors belonged to the Communist Party.<sup>20</sup> In 1952 the New York Teacher’s Union filed suit challenging the constitutionality of New York’s Feinberg Law, instituted in 1949 to fire any teacher who belonged to a “subversive organization.” In his dissent from the Supreme Court’s ruling against the teachers, Justice William O. Douglas worried that such a law “raises havoc with

academic freedom. It produces standardized thought, not the pursuit of truth.”<sup>21</sup> The majority would not agree with Douglas until five years later, when it recognized “academic freedom” as part of the First Amendment.<sup>22</sup>

Importantly, when the Court first recognized “academic freedom” as protected by the First Amendment, it drew its opinion from a statement of a conference of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa. The statement, issued in response to apartheid policy, reads:

In a university, knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A university ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or any sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates—“to follow the argument where it leads.” This implies the right to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a university. The concern of its scholars is not merely to add and revise facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever examining and modifying the framework itself.<sup>23</sup>

The Open Universities in South Africa were fighting the political oppression of legalized racial segregation. This statement was crafted as recognition that the university could be a space of resistance to such oppression. The statement reveals the political power in both the concept of “academic freedom” and the concept of the university as a potential revolutionary site. Whether the Supreme Court knew it or not, choosing to cite this passage set up a broad conception of “academic freedom” that included the protection of the university as a politicized space.

In spite of such radical implications, the idea of “academic freedom” continues to be tied to a more restricted version of liberal democracy in the United States. By 1967, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. solidified the legal importance of “academic freedom” in *Keyishian v. Board of Regents*: “Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendental value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. . . . The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”<sup>24</sup> Like those who first penned the American profession’s definition of “academic freedom,” the judiciary’s efforts to shape the identity of the university and of the nation sought stability and legitimacy in the comforts of larger liberal narratives. As “academic freedom” became subsumed by the traditional liberal “free speech” narrative, faculty became increasingly susceptible to the problem “academic freedom” had originally sought to prevent; the legal disciplining of political speech and the heightened policing of campus grounds as spaces in which to combat political oppression.

## WHEN OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF: DAVID HOROWITZ AND THE ACADEMIC BILL OF RIGHTS CAMPAIGN

Contemporary political and economic leaders recognize the potential power of student activists, and they historically have sought ways to divide, delegitimize, or dissuade political participation that questions institutional legitimacy.<sup>25</sup> David Horowitz is just such a political strategist. In 2006 Horowitz changed the name of the Center for the Study of Popular Culture, which he had created in 1988, to the David Horowitz Freedom Center. Freedom Center board chairman Jess Morgan explained the name change, “First, when the Center began, just as the Cold War was ending, we thought that the significant issue of our time would be the political radicalization of popular culture. The culture is still a battleground, but after 9/11, it is clear that freedom itself was under assault from the new totalitarianism of terror. Secondly, David Horowitz, the Center’s founder, has become increasingly identified with issues of freedom at home and abroad. We wanted to honor him and also support the efforts he has undertaken. The name change does this and rededicates us to the mission at hand.”<sup>26</sup> Why not? This strategy to rename his foundation enables Horowitz to mobilize a political campaign in a cultural war.

For Horowitz, “academic freedom” is the Trojan horse in that war.<sup>27</sup> Horowitz writes: “Lapsed radicals like ourselves are always condemned to regard the left as their Great White Whale. This book is a record of our sighting of the beast. We may not yet have set the final harpoon, but we have given chase.”<sup>28</sup> Horowitz’s plan of attack: “One has to stigmatize the left and segregate it.”<sup>29</sup> Regardless of whether one interprets him as an Epeius, a Captain Ahab, or a Governor Wallace, the author of *The Art of Political War and Other Radical Pursuits* undoubtedly is at war and is garnering governmental support as well as funds.

Although he maintains that his campaign for an Academic Bill of Rights is not a political project, Horowitz stigmatizes higher education as “Indoctrination U.”<sup>30</sup> Horowitz argues that his book *The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Academics in America* (2006), “is not intended as a text about left-wing bias in the university.”<sup>31</sup> He also notes, however, that “the clear (and limited) purpose is to demonstrate that the individuals are political activists before they are scholars.”<sup>32</sup> In *The Politics of Bad Faith: The Radical Assault on America’s Future* (1998), Horowitz writes, “A specter is haunting the American University, the last refuge of the Marxist left.”<sup>33</sup> The title of *Indoctrination U: The Left’s War against Academic Freedom* (2007) makes a similar point.<sup>34</sup> Later, in an interview with the *National Review Online’s* Kathryn Jean Lopez, Horowitz says, “Of course I have made serious charges against the Left, in particular that it has blacklisted conservatives in the academy and politicized its educational missions.”<sup>35</sup>

Horowitz sets up camp on the contested terrain of “academic freedom” not out of concern for any ideal marketplace of ideas in the university setting but as part of a cultural war. *The Art of Political War* offers

step-by-step instructions to the Republican Party on how to engage in political warfare not “just to prevail in an argument, but to destroy the enemy’s fighting ability.”<sup>36</sup> By attacking the very discourse that defines institutions of higher education and the identity of those within that space, Horowitz aims to discredit and dismantle the instrumentality of the use of campus space as faculty and student involvement in any politics (other than his own).

In order to be successful, Horowitz calculates a rhetorical strategy that embraces preexisting frameworks of liberal ideologies. His goal is to set the terms of the debate within naturalized, legitimized, and democratic narratives and thereby position all opponents as *unnatural*, *illegitimate*, and *undemocratic*. He is quite clear in his tactics. Under “*Position is defined by fear and hope*,” he writes, “It is important to work away from the negative image your opponent wants to pin on you. If you know you’re going to be attacked as morally imperious, it is a good idea to lead with a position that is inclusive and tolerant.”<sup>37</sup> Hence Horowitz’s appeal to the neutrality and universality of “academic freedom” in education is an effort to launch a “political cruise missile” at “Indoctrination U.”<sup>38</sup> After all, what sort of American is opposed to the neutrality and universality of healthy controversy in the all-access pass to a legitimate education? Who would want to witness the brainwashing of American youth by a particular political persuasion?

And yet, Horowitz has no trouble propositioning *his* political persuasion as the guidelines that syllabi and tenure should reflect. When confronted with his book’s comparison to Sen. Joseph McCarthy’s backlists, Horowitz’s fiery rhetoric continues to reap and sow ideological identifications. He charges, “*The Chronicle of Higher Education*, which has fallen into the hands of a leftist editor, ran a cover feature about Daniel Pipes, Martin Kramer, and me called ‘Worse than McCarthy.’ The piece was written by a well-known Communist apologist professor Ellen Schrecker who has recently become an apologist for Islamic terrorists like Sami al Arian as well.”<sup>39</sup> The sound bites abound.<sup>40</sup> According to Horowitz, the comparison to McCarthyism is a red herring in the *radical project to undermine democracy*: “The story of the campaign against academic freedom can also be read as a study in the methods of the radical project itself.”<sup>41</sup> Horowitz’s argument depends upon a vision of intellectuals as traitors in hiding: “It is true that the Left is rhetorically in retreat and for the moment has adopted more moderate self-descriptions. But that is hardly the same as surrendering its agendas or vacating the field of battle. It is more like adopting a political camouflage on entering hostile terrain.”<sup>42</sup> Yet interestingly, Horowitz adopts the camouflage of “freedom” in order to make headway among academic administrators and legislators.

Horowitz’s appeal to “academic freedom” has taken root precisely because of his ability to mediate a naturalizing and legitimating ideology of democracy with a naturalizing and legitimating rhetoric of “free speech.” Horowitz argues, “The purpose of an education in a democracy is to teach students how to think,



not what to think.”<sup>43</sup> Tapping into the rhetoric of “academic freedom’s” role in the larger ideological framework of a liberal democracy, Horowitz attempts to appear apolitical and high-minded.

The name of his proposed legislation reflects this strategic discursive move: “By adopting the Academic Bill of Rights, an institution would recognize scholarship rather than ideology as an appropriate academic enterprise.”<sup>44</sup> Horowitz use of “academic freedom” functions as doublespeak and enables him to project his own political strategies onto his opponents. For example, Horowitz’s campaign targets only intellectuals on the left, in particular scholars in feminist, critical cultural, and Marxist studies. In fact, in *Indoctrination U*’s list of the “150 worst courses in America, 59 are in women’s studies.” This number, taken from Scott Jaschik’s count in an article from *Inside Higher Ed*, “may not be precise, as there are a fair number of courses in the book that combine women’s studies and ethnic studies, or women’s studies and black studies, or queer studies and women’s studies, so some might count in different ways, but no other category comes close.”<sup>45</sup> Although Horowitz admits he has not attended one class from his list, he maintains that any course reflecting in its focus the “identity politics—the politics of radical feminism, queer revolution, and Afro-centrism—which is the basis of academic multiculturalism . . . is a form of intellectual fascism and, insofar as it has any politics, of political fascism as well.”<sup>46</sup> In his assessment of courses dealing with “any politics,” notice that he does not mention any business school classes, which are embedded with free market ideology and the politics of capitalism. As Jaschik notes, “This kind of overstatement of confirmation of foundational theories is a serious problem in economics departments and business schools. Yet, no one is calling for the abolition of economics departments.”<sup>47</sup> Quite the contrary, like Attorney General John Ashcroft in his warning to critics of Bush administration policy post–September 11, Horowitz positions cultural critics as a threat to democracy. In *Indoctrination U*, he writes, “The [American] consensus, in short, is the common cultural bond of the democracy of which all Americans are a part: out of many, *one*. It is this bond that is now under assault from radicals who have entrenched themselves in university culture. Side by side with this American consensus—and reflecting its values—there has been until recently a common understanding of the function of education in a democracy.”<sup>48</sup> Like the Bill of Rights, the *Academic Bill of Rights* appeals to a set of idealized, universal rights, somehow free from political ideology. Such doublespeak, however, reveals a political ploy to cast leftist intellectuals as antidemocratic, thereby disciplining the university to limit scholars’ and students’ freedom to explore more than just the Westernized world’s economic philosophy.

## FRAMING OF THE CAMPAIGN BY INTERESTED PARTIES

In addition to the members of the Republican Party who have offered Horowitz political and financial support, numerous professors, students, and political and social commentators have joined cause with him, while others accuse his appeal to democracy of reifying historically contingent and malleable rights regarding expression and consequently rearticulating existing relations of power. I have summarized the perspectives across this spectrum, organizing them in categories I have termed “the liberal faithful,” “the debunkers,” and the “politicos.” Examples of each of these positions follow.

### The “Liberal Faithful”

First, there is what I believe to be the largest group, the “liberal faithful.” By “liberal,” I do not mean to suggest that all who comprise this group are politically left-leaning. I do mean to suggest that they adhere to the traditional liberal “free speech” narrative that often accompanies a free market ideology. The fact that the “liberal faithful” are as likely to be conservative as they are to be liberal reveals just how malleable “free speech” can be. The “liberal faithful” understand “academic freedom” as “free speech,” a moral principle that is universal and natural, only this time in the setting of the university. Like the Supreme Court, the “liberal faithful” view the university as a microcosm of democracy, thriving only under the proper conditions of rational, deliberate debate. More often than not, they take Horowitz’s argument at face value. While they might disagree among themselves over which direction the “threat” to “academic freedom” comes from, they tend to concur that there is indeed a threat, and that this threat is external to David Horowitz.

The popularity of such a response is seen in the emergence of offshoot organizations to the David Horowitz Freedom Center, like Students for Academic Freedom (SAF) and Parents and Students for Academic Freedom (K–12) (PSAF).<sup>49</sup> The SAF mobilizes students against a perceived Leftist indoctrination within the universities. Both the SAF and PSAF describe themselves as “clearing houses and communications centers for a national coalition of student organizations whose goal is to end the political abuse of the university and to restore integrity to the academic mission as a disinterested pursuit of knowledge.”<sup>50</sup> Orchestrated by Horowitz, these organizations become a voice for his political agenda under the guise of political neutrality. But the “liberal faithful” are not restricted to students and parents.

For example, Elizabeth Hoffman, president of the University of Colorado System, is part of a group that feels that “the only serious opposition to the Academic Bill of Rights is that, although its principles are valid, it duplicates academic-freedom guidelines that already exist.”<sup>51</sup> Such passive commentary suggests little suspicion of ulterior motives in Horowitz’s campaign for “academic freedom,” since such natural and legitimate guidelines “already exist.” Hoffman’s intervention in the debate on Horowitz’s terms reflects Horowitz’s success in strategically using “academic freedom” to simply mediate an ideology without calling attention to discrepancies and existing relations of power.

Others share Hoffman's faith in Horowitz's motivation but believe more firmly that the campaign for "academic freedom" is needed. David Ward, president of the American Council on Education, writes, "What was happening was that individuals who were critics of higher education were making, to my mind, perfectly reasonable statements that universities should be places of intellectual pluralism, civility and fairness. I might quibble about details, but I found myself saying, 'They have a point.'"<sup>52</sup> Ward, like supporters of Students for Academic Freedom, adopts Horowitz's argument and furthers it, claiming that current campus conditions have created yet another demand that "academic freedom" be revised so that depoliticized academic studies may advance objective study. Although this position suggests concern about potential power inequalities on college campuses, it fails to identify where this power inequality resides, remaining vulnerable to Horowitz's persuasive claims that critical cultural studies (i.e., gender studies, race studies, etc.) are the culprits.

In perhaps the most notoriously "liberal faithful" move, some criticize Horowitz's campaign procedurally but not substantively. For example, instead of confronting Horowitz directly, some say that the Academic Bill of Rights would lead to legal infringement on the self-government of academic institutions. Robert C. Andringa, president of the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, states, "Horowitz's legislation is wrong because it is inappropriate for legislative bodies to get involved in academic freedom issues."<sup>53</sup> In identifying the "wrongdoing" as state interference, Andringa and many members of the AAUP unknowingly contribute to the sanctity of "academic freedom" as the locus of debate.

Others, like Stanley Fish, add a complicated component to the "liberal faithful." Fish voices a fundamental, as opposed to merely procedural, disagreement with Horowitz: "The strong suggestion is that academic freedom and intellectual diversity go together, but in fact they pull in opposite directions. Academic freedom is the freedom to go wherever an intellectual inquiry takes you without regard to directives proclaimed in advance by a regime of prior restraint. Intellectual diversity is a prior restraint; it tells you where to look and what you must look at—you must take into account every point of view independently of whether you think it is worth considering—and it tells you what materials you must include in your syllabus."<sup>54</sup> Similarly, Graham Larkin adds, "This monitoring would deprive people of fundamental liberties of expression, and legislating it would lead to an ethical and administrative quagmire."<sup>55</sup> However, it is Fish's belief in the legitimacy of Horowitz's argument, as well as in the ability of "academic freedom" to be apolitical, that Fish embodies the "liberal faithful" camp. Fish writes, "I believe [Horowitz], and I believe him in part, because much of the Academic Bill of Rights is as apolitical and principled as he says it is."<sup>56</sup>

The "liberal faithful" do not question the value and neutrality of "academic freedom." They may point to discrepancies in the legal definition of the term or challenge state intervention in campus administrative business, but they never question Horowitz's ostensibly neutral attempts to "restore" "academic freedom." By refusing to question the terrain on which Horowitz's campaign stands, the "liberal faithful" fail to gain any ground. As a consequence, they

unknowingly welcome the Trojan horse of “academic freedom” into their classrooms and offices, and leave the battleground vulnerable to a lopsided political fight.

### The “Debunkers”

The second category of interlocutors in this debate includes those I call the “debunkers.” The aim of the “debunker” is to discredit Horowitz on the basis of his inaccuracy and foolishness, as if he were a crank. The “debunkers” either (a) use humor to downplay or belittle the threat of Horowitz’s campaign or (b) claim “expertise” to discredit Horowitz’s argument.

There is no better exemplar of the first type of “debunker” than Michael Bérubé. Representing the more conservative side of the AAUP, Bérubé, who often refers to Horowitz as “D. Ho,” “Horowitz,” or, on occasion, “He Who Shall Not Be Designated by His First Initial and a Drastic Truncation of His Surname,” engages the field through a war of words. In a blog entry titled “Warning! Warning! Danger! Danger,” Bérubé describes how he feels about his inclusion on Horowitz’s blacklist: “Truth be told, this ‘101 most dangerous professors’ thing is a complete sham. It’s a travesty. It’s an outrage, I say, an utter outrage. First of all, Horowitz didn’t even bother to rank us. . . . And according to my contacts at the American Association of University Professors, only 23 of the 101 are members of the AAUP. What the hell is the matter with the other 78 of you? Consider this your wakeup call, people!”<sup>57</sup> Bérubé uses comedy to convey disapproval of Horowitz. However, he hedges: “I have always been struck that Horowitz has no sense of humor whatsoever, and I’m afraid I have used that against him rather mercilessly.”<sup>58</sup> By suggesting that Horowitz cannot take a joke, Bérubé reveals that, in the end, at least for him, this is all just a verbal game rather than an actual struggle over the autonomy of intellectuals and their institutions. Bérubé’s “debunking” of Horowitz through humor and puns has become a widely utilized method for coping with personal attacks and reclaiming public ethos. For example, Roger Bowen, general secretary of the AAUP, described Horowitz’s proposals as “an academic bill of wrongs.”<sup>59</sup>

Other “debunkers” are a bit less comical in their commentary. Coping with the personal nature of the attacks, some “debunkers” respond through their respective academic lenses. More often than not, such “debunkers” rely on their education to “reveal” Horowitz’s misrepresentations of facts and people. For example, Maurice Isserman of the AAUP notes that “one way to fight back against contemporary assaults on the values of the American academy is to expose lies when we hear them.”<sup>60</sup> Jeffery Klein spends his air time documenting with expert precision the instances of plagiarism in Horowitz’s work.<sup>61</sup> Robert Jensen works through Horowitz’s misconceptions of him, writing, “I’m glad Horowitz got my name right (people often misspell it ‘Jenson’). But everything else is distortion, and that one sentence teaches much about the reactionary right’s disingenuous rhetorical strategy.”<sup>62</sup> In a similar attempt to undermine Horowitz’s academic standing, Kurt Smith turns the tables: “Mr. Horowitz should follow his own advice

about professors sticking to their subject areas. Since he has no experience in higher education, he should not offer to solve higher education's problems."<sup>63</sup> Jensen and Smith seem to critique Horowitz's "team" for not "playing by the rules."

The rhetorical shortcoming of these strategies lies in the "debunkers'" inability to confront anything other than Horowitz's research practices. Moreover, comedic discourse is seriously limited in its ability to effect social change. There is a danger, as Lisa Perks reminds us in her work on the empowering and disempowering features of humorous communication, that humor will lead to complacency. Quoting Kenneth Burke, Perks explains, "Burke condemns the impotence of humor. In opposition to the comic strategy of empowering a heroic figure and encouraging others to identify with that figure, Burke claims that humor emphasizes the 'feebleness of those in the situation by *dwarfing the situation*.' . . . [It] provokes an attitude of 'happy stupidity' and diminishes individuals' perceptions of their capacity for social change. Burke further notes that mocking another person (through humor) generally involves identification between the amused party and the victim of laughter, thus lowering the character of both."<sup>64</sup> Consequently, "debunkers" often fall short in their attempts to discredit Horowitz's argument. After all, if we chuckle as we walk by one of Horowitz's lectures on a college campus, dismissing him as a crank without expertise, his campaign rages onward, unthwarted.

### The "Politicos"

What I believe to be the third major category of response to Horowitz I call the "politicos." In Virgil's *The Aeneid*, which tells the story of the Greek siege of the city of Troy, a priest named Laocoön and the Trojan soothsayer Cassandra try to warn the Trojans that the Greek gift of the gigantic wooden horse is a stratagem of war.<sup>65</sup> The Trojans dismiss both Laocoön and Cassandra. Similarly, I believe that, in the struggle over "academic freedom," the "politicos" are the critics who recognize the Trojan horse for what it hides: a cultural war waging across America's college campuses. Although not always united in an instrumental or even constitutive response, many scholars step forth to critique Horowitz's intentions, finding his abuse of "facts" less important to challenge than his political agenda. The recognition of Horowitz's use of "academic freedom" in a hegemonic struggle is key to the "politico" position.

One such "politico" is Ellen Schrecker, who writes, "Despite its heavy reliance on the traditional rhetoric of academic freedom, the 'academic bill of rights' seriously undermines that freedom. By injecting extraneous political considerations into personnel and curricular decisions, the measure not only interferes with those areas of educational policy that are traditional responsibility of the faculty, it also disregards the professional standards that guarantee the quality of American higher education."<sup>66</sup> Schrecker's criticism of Horowitz's "political considerations" and their potential impact on academic freedom and the subsequent role of the university in promoting healthy citizenry fails to

call out the ways larger liberal discourses are used to foster identification with political positions. However, Schrecker does recognize that Horowitz's gift horse is harboring more than he is letting on.

In an effort to reveal this threat, several "politicos" attempt to draw historical analogies to previous war efforts. Aligning Horowitz's campaign with that of McCarthyism, Dana Cloud, like the U.S. Army's chief legal representative, Joseph Nye Welch, who challenged McCarthy's tactics, asserts, "Horowitz's theatrics and demagoguery mask a very serious agenda: to discredit, harass and censor critical intellectuals and activists on our campuses. He knows that universities have historically been organizing against the war and against the greed and hypocrisy of the right, and he would like nothing more than to hound us from our jobs."<sup>67</sup> Cloud warns, "In this atmosphere, antiwar professors aren't safe, and a growing number of outspoken critical intellectuals are facing university firing squads."<sup>68</sup> Cloud calls for increased public scrutiny of Horowitz's agenda and points out that new faculty guidelines (such as the Horowitz-inspired guidelines now governing faculty codes of conduct at both Temple University and Penn State) mimic loyalty oaths required of government employees in the fifties, and that they have resulted in actual loss of employment. Cloud concludes, "He must be confronted wherever he appears, and whenever he launches his attacks—or down the road, we may be remembering the Horowitz years as we do the devastation wrought on the left by Joseph McCarthy."<sup>69</sup>

According to those who understand the campaign for academic freedom as part of a larger cultural war, what is to be done is nothing short of the organizing, agitating, and confronting of a retaliatory movement. Sunsara Taylor states, "David Horowitz has a long and scurrilous track record of blatant racism, politically-driven witch-hunts in academia, and constantly spewing out bald-faced lies.... To let the lies of [Islamofascism Awareness Week] stand unexposed and unopposed would be a grave mistake with lasting consequences."<sup>70</sup> Alexander Cockburn suggests, "The reaction of the left has been mixed. In some ways it always takes Horowitz's antics far too seriously, though the latter's effect on timid college administrations cannot be entirely gainsaid. On the other hand, Awareness week is having a galvanizing effect. Coalitions have formed to combat Horowitz's version of Awareness with superior Progressive Awareness about what is good or not so good about Islam...Horowitz is probably the best organizer the left has these days."<sup>71</sup> Recognizing that one option in the cultural war is for the Left to consider Horowitz an invaluable flanking tool, "politicos" hope to alienate and ostracize Horowitz's campaign, so that even the right might begin to consider him more of a liability than an advocate.

Frequently, however, "politicos" wage war under the burden of incredulity. Moreover, modern-day Horowitz doublespeak shifts attention from his role as culture warrior by charging those who recognize his purposes as violators of "academic freedom" and the principle "free speech." Horowitz claims,

I do her the courtesy she tried to deny me by letting her talk. . . . When Ms. Cloud finished, I pointed out that organizing mobs to scream epithets at invited speakers fit the category of "McCarthyite" a lot more snugly than my support for a pluralism of views in university classrooms. . . . I don't know of a single leftist speaker

among the thousands who visit campuses every term who has been obstructed or attacked by conservative students, who are too decent and too tolerant to do that. The entire evening in Texas reminded me of the late Orianna Fallaci's observation that what we are facing in the post-9/11 world is not a "clash of civilizations," but a clash of civilization versus barbarism.<sup>72</sup>

In one breath, Horowitz strips Cloud of her expertise (referring to her as "Ms." instead of "Dr."), turns the tables on her reference to McCarthyism (arguing that, unlike Welch, Cloud does not follow rules of "decency" and "rationality") and claims that he wants pluralistic classrooms. Using the "clash of civilizations" trope that Cloud herself has written about, Horowitz casts Cloud as a terrorist, threatening not just American democracy but the youth of American democracy.

The success of Horowitz's rhetorical dislocation of the political critique of Cloud and other "politicos" is evident in the extent to which even the "liberal faithful" begin to attack those who challenge Horowitz. One "liberal faithful" scholar writes,

A liberal democracy depends on the norm of reciprocity. Minority views survive and someday become majorities (or not) because they know what happens to me can happen to you. Such reciprocity breeds trust; we both know that we can count on a free expression of our views. Thus, we do not fear the results of a policy disagreement or an election. When that norm is violated—when the minority insists it doesn't have to abide by an election in 1860 or when suits riot in 2000, preventing a fair and accurate count of an election—then the trust essential to democracy disappears. This is a bad thing. It's better for Horowitz to have his podium and for Dana to have her classroom than for both to engage in a mutually assured escalation of shouting down. That's a different kind of reciprocity and the trajectory, again, is not a good one.<sup>73</sup>

And, just like that, we are returned to square one: a circular argument over who decides who gets "free speech," and a privileging of "free speech" as the moral absolute needed to coexist with others.

## CONCLUSION

Thanks to the "liberal faithful," with no help from the "debunkers," and despite the warning cries from the "politicos," Horowitz's Trojan horse has made it through the university gates. There is little one can do now but engage or disengage Horowitz's cultural war. If one chooses engagement, perhaps the best one can do is to break away from the discourse of "academic freedom." This does not mean the concept is unimportant, nor does it mean the narrative should not be engaged for other purposes. It does mean, however, that a continued emphasis on "academic freedom" inevitably results in a return to "free speech," which in turn means a constant barrage of arguments about civility, decorum, and neutrality. The legal codification of

“academic freedom” is just as ambiguous, and can be just as malleable and contradictory, as the laws of “free speech.”

Until we break away from “academic freedom,” Van Alstyne’s warning becomes an imminent threat: As “academic freedom” becomes a contextualized reiteration of “free speech,” Horowitz’s attack on leftist intellectuals becomes yet another example of the deployment of the “free speech” trope to discipline the site of college campuses and make academics subject to persecution under one category when engaging in the other. Consequently, standing up for one’s artistic license in the creation of a syllabus suddenly becomes inappropriate speech in the workplace. Engagement in legitimate, legally protected protest suddenly becomes grounds to attack one’s job credentials. If professors are vulnerable because of the disciplinary force of the term “academic freedom,” the climate on campus becomes chilled and campus is discredited overall as a political space.

In this essay I have explored how “free speech” functions through “academic freedom.” Analyzing David Horowitz’s Academic Bill of Rights campaign, I have demonstrated that savvy rhetors are capable of manipulating “academic freedom” by evoking the malleable abstraction of “free speech.” Horowitz is able to garner political legitimacy by appearing neutral and objective while projecting his own political maneuvers onto his opponents, leftist intellectuals. By exploring three major responses to Horowitz’s efforts—those of the “liberal faithful,” the “debunkers,” and the “politicos”—I have argued that current responses to Horowitz fall short of the type of intervention needed.

Leftist responses to the Right’s intervention in campus politics in the name of “academic freedom” have accepted this term and argued over definitions, engaged in witty repartee in attempts to diminish the threat of Horowitz’s campaign, or exposed themselves to an attack for not engaging in civil discourse. In this essay, I have attempted to show that there simply is no political neutrality to “academic freedom”; on the contrary, intellectuals left and right are all always engaged in politics.<sup>74</sup> Instead of accepting the pretense that some sort of ideal neutrality is possible in the classroom, we must recreate the opportunity for “academic freedom” to protect academics who serve as not just educators but critics and activists as well.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> *Democracy Now!*, “Hundreds of Thousands Take Part in National Day of Action to Defend Public Education,” Past Shows, entry, <http://www.democracynow.org/2010/3/5/students> (accessed March 24, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> March 4th Strike and Day of Action, “National Call,” March 4 Day of Action and Strike in Defense of Public Education, entry, <http://defendcapubliceducation.wordpress.com/2009/12/14/national-call/> (accessed March 24, 2010).

<sup>3</sup> *Democracy Now!*, “Hundreds of Thousands Take Part in National Day of Action to Defend Public Education.”

<sup>4</sup> See Hal Draper, “The Student Movement of the Thirties: A Political History,” in *As We Saw the Thirties*, ed. Rita James Simon (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1967). Draper notes, “For the next couple of decades at least, wherever anything was stirring in the labor movement or in liberal campaigns, wherever there was action for progressive causes or voices were raised in dissent from the Establishment, there one was sure to find alumni of the student movement, who had gotten their political education and organizational training and experience in the American Student Union or the Student League for Industrial Democracy or the National Student League.”

<sup>5</sup> Max Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao, and Che* (New York: Verso, 2002), 18.

<sup>6</sup> Both events were connected to protests over funding cuts. See Terence Chea, “Day Of Action UPDATE: At March 4 Protests Rowdy CA Students, Reportedly Armed, Block Campus,” *Huffington Post*, March 4, 2010, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/04/day-of-action-update-rowd\\_n\\_486276.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/04/day-of-action-update-rowd_n_486276.html). See also Kit Gallant, “Take Back NYU! Change We Can Believe In?,” *Huffington Post*, February 20, 2009, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kit-gallant/take-back-nyu-change-we-c\\_b\\_168560.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kit-gallant/take-back-nyu-change-we-c_b_168560.html).

<sup>7</sup> Tony Cliff points out, “Nowhere else in capitalist society are young people separated off and pooled together in the same way.” See Tony Cliff, *A World to Win: Life of a Revolutionary* (London: Bookmarks, 2000), 86.

<sup>8</sup> See David Horowitz and Jacob Laskin, *One-Party Classroom: How Radical Professors at America's Top Colleges Indoctrinate Students and Undermine Our Democracy* (New York: Crown, 2009).

<sup>9</sup> William W. Van Alstyne, *The American First Amendment in the Twenty-First Century*, 3rd ed. (New York: Foundation, 2002), 62.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 69. The crux of Van Alstyne’s concern originates in the 1940 Statement: “As a man of learning and an educational officer, he should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.” American Association of University Professors and American Association of Colleges, *1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*, <http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1940statement.htm> (accessed March 24, 2010).

<sup>12</sup> Walter P. Metzger, “Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America,” *Texas Law Review* 66 (June 1988): 1269–70.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 1271.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Interestingly, the AAUP’s definition of academic freedom abandoned its German heritage of *Lernfreiheit*, or any sentiment articulating the academic freedom of the student. Although they did not offer reasoning for this amputation, Metzger suggests that it was assumed that academic freedom of a professor would naturally produce academic freedom of a student. See Metzger, “Profession and Constitution,” 1267–85.

<sup>16</sup> American Association of University Professors, “1915 Declaration of Principles,” in *Academic Freedom and Tenure: A Handbook of the American Association of University Professors*, ed. Louis Joughin (December 12, 1915; repr., Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 156.

<sup>17</sup> American Association of University Professors and American Association of Colleges, *1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*.

<sup>18</sup> American Association of University Professors, “1915 Declaration of Principles,” 156.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> For a contextual analysis, see Sidney Hook, “Should Communists Be Permitted to Teach?,” *New York Times*, February 27, 1949. See also Alexander Meiklejohn, “Should Communists Be Allowed to Teach?,” *New York Times*, March 27, 1949.

- <sup>21</sup> See *Adler v. Board of Educ. of City of New York*, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). Interestingly, Douglas was a professor before he was a Supreme Court justice.
- <sup>22</sup> *Sweezy v. New Hampshire*, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). Majority opinion recognized “the four essential freedoms of a university—to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”
- <sup>23</sup> Open Universities in South Africa, “Statement” (a conference of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand, including A. v. d. S. Centlivres and Richard Feetham, as chancellors of the respective universities), 10–12.
- <sup>24</sup> *Keyishian v. Board of Regents*, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
- <sup>25</sup> For example, consider the methodological manner in which the University of Berkeley administration worked to end the protest by the Free Speech Movement in 1964. See Fact-Finding Committee of Graduate Political Scientists, *The Berkeley Free Speech Controversy*, [http://www.fsm-a.org/stacks/FSM\\_gradchronology.html](http://www.fsm-a.org/stacks/FSM_gradchronology.html) (accessed March 24, 2010).
- <sup>26</sup> FrontPage Magazine, “A New Birth of Freedom,” *FrontPage Magazine*, July 7, 2006, <http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=3669>.
- <sup>27</sup> Stanley Fish, “‘Intellectual Diversity’: The Trojan Horse of a Dark Design,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, February 13, 2004. Fish describes Horowitz’s appeals to “intellectual diversity” as a Trojan horse.
- <sup>28</sup> Peter Collier and David Horowitz, *Deconstructing the Left* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991).
- <sup>29</sup> Scott Sherman, “David Horowitz’s Long March,” *The Nation*, 3 July 2000, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20000703/sherman>.
- <sup>30</sup> David Horowitz, *Indoctrination U: The Left’s War against Academic Freedom* (New York: Encounter, 2007).
- <sup>31</sup> David Horowitz, *The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Academics in America* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2006), 1. Lest we be tempted to follow the red herring of Horowitz’s distinction between liberals and “leftists,” let us note that in *The Politics of Bad Faith* he writes, “On the Left, the conflicts between radicals and liberals are far less fundamental, concerning means rather than ends.” David Horowitz, *The Politics of Bad Faith: The Radical Assault on America’s Future* (New York: Touchstone, 1998), 12.
- <sup>32</sup> Horowitz, *Professors*, xx.
- <sup>33</sup> Horowitz, *Politics of Bad Faith*, 155.
- <sup>34</sup> Horowitz, *Indoctrination U*.
- <sup>35</sup> Kathryn Jean Lopez, “The Professors: David Horowitz Writes Up Faculty,” *National Review Online*, March 13, 2006, <http://www.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/qa200603130909.asp>.
- <sup>36</sup> David Horowitz, *The Art of Political War and Other Radical Pursuits* (Dallas: Spence, 2000), 10.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.
- <sup>38</sup> “The first new weapon Republicans need in their arsenal is a sound bite,” he states, “a political cruise missile.” *Ibid.*, 18.
- <sup>39</sup> Lopez, “Professors.”
- <sup>40</sup> In the war-machine of sound bites, Horowitz compiles ammunition as he organizes professors’ scholarship, political activity, and organizational affiliations alongside terms such as “jihad,” “terrorists,” “anti-patriotic,” and so on. Under each name in his *Professors* list are bullet points of “dangerous characteristics.” Some of these include Derrick Bell, “pioneer of ‘critical race theory;”” Noam Chomsky, “prolific pamphleteer and academia’s most influential leftist”; Dana Cloud, a “member of the Internationalist Socialist Organization”; Suzanne Toton, who “promotes libertarian theology, a form of Marxism disguised as Christianity”; and the late Howard Zinn, still considered dangerous for the popularity of his “pedestrian Marxism” history book, *A People’s History of the United States*. See Horowitz, *Professors*, 56, 84, 92, 355–56. Horowitz writes, “Well, as I argue in my book, this is the tip of an iceberg that probably includes between 30,000 and 60,000 faculty activists whose agendas are political and radical.” See Lopez, “Professors.”
- <sup>41</sup> Horowitz, *Indoctrination U*, xvi.
- <sup>42</sup> Horowitz, *Politics of Bad Faith*, 3.
- <sup>43</sup> David Horowitz and Kurt Smith, “Does the Academic Bill of Rights Protect or Threaten Academic Freedom? A Debate between David Horowitz and Kurt Smith,” interview by Jessica S. Kozloff, September 19, 2006, *Front Page Magazine*, [http://97.74.65.51/readStatic.aspx?area=Debate\\_between\\_David\\_Horowitz\\_and\\_Kurt\\_Smith](http://97.74.65.51/readStatic.aspx?area=Debate_between_David_Horowitz_and_Kurt_Smith).
- <sup>44</sup> David Horowitz, “In Defense of Intellectual Diversity,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, February 13, 2004, <http://chronicle.com/article/In-Defense-of-Intellectual/10135/>.
- <sup>45</sup> Scott Jaschik, “David Horowitz vs. Women’s Studies,” *Inside Higher Ed*, February 25, 2009.

- <sup>46</sup> David Horowitz, "Mussolini and Neo-fascist Tribalism: Up from Multiculturalism," *Heterodoxy*, January 1998, <http://www.fiu.edu/~yaf/multigarbage.html>.
- <sup>47</sup> Jaschik, "David Horowitz vs. Women's Studies."
- <sup>48</sup> Horowitz, *Indoctrination U*, xiii.
- <sup>49</sup> This essay does not address the complexities of pro-Horowitz organizations like Students for Academic Freedom, and Parents and Students for Academic Freedom. Horowitz founded the SAF in 2001, long before he changed the name of the mother organization, now known as the David Horowitz Freedom Center.
- <sup>50</sup> See Students for Academic Freedom, "About SAF," Students for Academic Freedom, <http://www.studentsforacademicfreedom.org/about/> (accessed March 26, 2010). See also Parents and Students for Academic Freedom, "About Us," Parents and Students for Academic Freedom, <http://www.psaf.org/> (accessed March 26, 2010).
- <sup>51</sup> Horowitz, "In Defense of Intellectual Diversity."
- <sup>52</sup> Scott Jaschik, "David Horowitz Wins a Round," *Inside Higher Ed*, April 20, 2009.
- <sup>53</sup> Jaschik.
- <sup>54</sup> Stanley Fish, "Think Again," *New York Times*, May 2, 2006.
- <sup>55</sup> Larkin, Graham, "What's Not to Like about the Academic Bill of Rights," CA-AAUP, [http://www.aaup-ca.org/Larkin\\_abor.html](http://www.aaup-ca.org/Larkin_abor.html) (accessed March 24, 2010).
- <sup>56</sup> Fish, "Think Again."
- <sup>57</sup> Michael Bérubé, "Warning! Warning! Danger! Danger!," February 6, 2006, [http://www.michaelberube.com/index.php/weblog/warning\\_warning\\_danger\\_danger/](http://www.michaelberube.com/index.php/weblog/warning_warning_danger_danger/).
- <sup>58</sup> Bartlett.
- <sup>59</sup> Thomas Bartlett, "Breaking Bread: Horowitz v. Bérubé," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, December 8, 2006.
- <sup>60</sup> Maurice Isserman, "Fighting Back: Whose Truth?," *Academe Online* 91, no. 5 (September–October 2005), <http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/academe/2005/SO/Feat/isse.htm>.
- <sup>61</sup> Jeffery Klein, "'You Have Our Permission to Put Your Names on Our Press Release': Right-Wing Academic Values," *CounterPunch*, March 14, 2007.
- <sup>62</sup> Robert Jensen, "Take a Class from One of the *CounterPunch* 16: Horowitz's Academic Hit List," *CounterPunch*, February 8, 2006. It should be noted that in a later article, Jensen turns from correcting Horowitz to articulating the danger in conflating goals and strategies as the liberals and the left unite against Horowitz. Robert Jensen, "You Can't Rely on Them Politically: Why Leftists Mistrust Liberals," *CounterPunch*, April 27, 2006.
- <sup>63</sup> Quoted in Dave Lindorff, "This Mouth for Hire: Horowitz on Campus," *CounterPunch*, September 25, 2006.
- <sup>64</sup> Lisa Perks, "A Sketch Comedy of Errors: Chappelle's Show, Stereotypes, and Viewers" (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2008), 50–51, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/etd/d/2008/perks17856/perks17856.pdf#page=3>. See also Kenneth Burke, *Attitudes toward History*, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 20, 43; and Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 226.
- <sup>65</sup> See Virgil, "Book II," in *Aeneid*, trans. A. S. Kline (repr., 2002), <http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Latin/Virgilhome.htm>. Laocoön says, "I fear Greeks, even those bearing gifts."
- <sup>66</sup> Ellen Schrecker, "Point of View: Worse than McCarthy," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, February 10, 2006.
- <sup>67</sup> Dana Cloud, "Return of the Campus Witch Hunts: David Horowitz and the Thought Police," *CounterPunch*, March 8, 2007, <http://www.counterpunch.org/cloud03082007.html>.
- <sup>68</sup> Cloud writes, "The University of Colorado has moved to dismiss American Indian scholar Ward Churchill in the wake of Horowitz's attacks. Other targets include Douglas Giles[,] . . . Kevin Barrett[,] . . . Juan Cole[,] . . . Nancy Rabinowitz[,] . . . Nicholas De. Genova[,] . . . Timothy Shortell[, and]. . . Joel Beinin." Cloud, "Return of the Campus Witch Hunts."
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>70</sup> Sunsara Taylor, "Exposing 'Islamofascism Awareness Week': David Horowitz Can't Handle the Truth," *CounterPunch*, October 22, 2007.
- <sup>71</sup> Alexander Cockburn, "Thank You, David Horowitz: So Much for Islamofascism Awareness," *CounterPunch*, October 27/28, 2007.
- <sup>72</sup> David Horowitz, "Campus Leftists Don't Believe in Free Speech," *Wall Street Journal*, April 19, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124000847769030489.html>.

<sup>73</sup> John Murphy, "I Am That Liberal Dana Cloud Dislikes," *Oratorical Animal*, [http://oratoricalanimal.typepad.com/oratorical\\_animal/2009/04/i-am-that-liberal-dana-cloud-dislikes.html](http://oratoricalanimal.typepad.com/oratorical_animal/2009/04/i-am-that-liberal-dana-cloud-dislikes.html) (accessed March 26, 2010).

<sup>74</sup> After all, in 2010, the Texas State Board of Education approved a curriculum change to social science studies in secondary schools: "Teachers in Texas will be required to cover the Judeo-Christian influences of the nation's Founding Fathers, but not highlight the philosophical rationale for the separation of church and state." See April Castro, "Texas Education Board Approves Conservative Curriculum Changes by Far-Right," *Huffington Post*, March 12, 2010, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/12/texas-education-board-app\\_n\\_497440.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/12/texas-education-board-app_n_497440.html).