Origins of the Association:
An Anniversary Address

By WALTER P. METZGER

It is always a pleasure to speak to colleagues on an anniversary, and it is a special privilege to do so at a moment when past and present leaders grace the company and well-wishers gather from afar. I am not unaware that the conviviality of such reunions can breed vainglorious illusions, such as the belief that an organization, just by aging, confirms its effectiveness and worth. The truth, sad to say, can be less attractive: an organization can be a tortoise; it can achieve longevity by avoiding accidents; it can grow up sluggishly in a shell. But I do not fear that we are about to count our blessings merely by totalling up our years. For one thing, we can be sure that we are in the midst of celebrating something more than the petty victory of survival. That the AAUP is old but not senescent is affirmed by its recent gains in membership—over 70 per cent in the last decennium; that its 66,000 members is a striking total is affirmed by the fact that this society, unlike other professional associations, neither penalizes those who do not join it nor monopolizes the loyalties of those who do. Never distinguishing between insiders and outsiders so as to make affiliation a prudential tactic, never trying to become a polarizing force in order to solidify allegiances, the Association gets its growing multitudes by dint of its professional and restrained appeal. Venerable plus vitality is the happy impression that this feat creates.

There is another reason why we shun peacockishness—it offends the academic style. Whether because they are trained to be skeptical or because they are born to be cantankerous, professors in association do not readily succumb to group conceit. Characteristically, the letters printed in the Bulletin are of the critical, not congratulatory, variety; typically, the conversational emphasis in committees is on mending operational deficiencies; symptomatically, the response of the Association to its impending jubilee was to set up a committee to survey itself. As it describes the organization’s personality, so this spirit, it seems to me, defines the requirements of this occasion; and it is in this spirit that I have set myself the obligation, not of dwelling on our key accomplishments, but of surveying certain lesser realized aims. No one can doubt that, in the area of academic freedom and tenure, the Association has accomplished more than outsiders had expected of it, almost as much as it had expected of itself. To appraise the significance of that accomplishment, one need only conjure up the consequences of its absence. How weary, stale, flat and (above all) unprofitable would be the dialogue on academic freedom! How much more often would it be heard in Gothic circles that a professor, at odds with his employer, has the academic duty to be silent or the academic freedom to depart! How much more widespread would be the practice of hiring teachers by the year, after no matter how many years of service! Or of holding them on indefinite appointments whose primary characteristic is that they are indefinites! Or of removing them in literal accord with ordinances that embody the non-Freudian pleasure principle! And how much less we would all know about the tie between freedom and tenure, the tension between law and morality, without the half-century of case experience that is the AAUP’s great didactic gift! But all of this goes without saying, and cannot be said without boasting: to keep to the right side of the line between collective pride and collective puerility, I shall address myself to other things. Turning from the fiftieth year to the first one, I shall describe the professional situation that gave rise to the founding of the Association—a situation which despite its archaic features bears significant resemblances to our own. A number of aims that inspired the founding were lost or pursued half-heartedly in the years that followed; I shall indicate why I think this occurred. Finally, and very briefly, I shall apply the lessons of this history of frustrated effort to the challenges that the AAUP confronts today.

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In 1913, a professor taking stock of his profession was bound to be struck by the changes that had taken place within his lifetime, very possibly within the span of his own career. One change was glaring and momentous: American higher education, which had long been a pinched and small-scale enterprise, had recently undergone immense expansion. It had enjoyed enormous economic gains: between 1863 and 1913, while the national income had quadrupled, the income of colleges and universities had multiplied almost eleven times. There had been a considerable
increase in student numbers: the percentage of persons of college age enrolled in collegiate institutions had more than doubled in those 50 years. In addition the size of academic units had greatly expanded: a score of the largest universities enrolled as many students in 1913 as had all the colleges of the country in 1870. The inner corollary of this external growth was a vastly more diversified curriculum. For more than two centuries the American colleges had placed their students on a restricted diet of classical languages, Protestant metaphysics, rhetoric, logic, and mathematics, natural and moral philosophy, and a smattering of physical science. Now and again, new dishes had been added to their Spartan table, but, on the whole, up to the era of expansion, the American academic system had clung to the limited fare that its meager resources afforded, its classical bias defended, and its religious interest endorsed. Then, rather quickly, under the impetus of wealth, it commenced to increase its offerings, partly by incorporating the derecta membra of medicine, law, and engineering; partly by introducing new technical and commercial lines; partly through subject differentiation, whereby old disciplines generated many new. The tangible sign of the new diversity was the bulging size of the college catalogue—the annual announcement of the impending banquet; the ultimate triumph of the new diversity was the widespread adoption of the elective system—the growth of consumer discretion in the face of a multiplicity of choice.

Inevitably, changes in the academic setting set off changes in the academic calling. Traditionally, the American academic work-force had been derived from religious and pietic sources. After the transforming years, the bulk of new academic manpower came from secular agencies, especially from the new American graduate schools. For ages, the American professoriate had been intellectually homogeneous: possessing a common fund of knowledge, each member had (figuratively) spoken the same language and had (literally) spoken the same languages. With the broadening of the curriculum, the American professoriate became intellectually heterogeneous; each member took a fragment from a growing storeroom, and each fragment had a different code. The third change was probably the most important, for it bore on the very purpose of the calling. From the time of the founding of the primal colleges, the main function of professors had been to teach. On this, there had been no distinction between one sort of professor and another, one type of institution and another. As late as 1869, Charles W. Eliot, on assuming the Harvard presidency, had said that "the prime business of American professors... must be regular and assiduous class teaching." By 1908, however, the same authority had come to believe that appointment and promotion in his institution should depend as much on the record of published works as on pedagogical capacity. Reflected in this change in the reward-system was the arrival of research-oriented institutions, the foremost expression of the expansion impulse. Though not the typical institutions of higher learning, the Harvards, Chicages and Johns Hopkinses had become the paragon institutions of higher learning, and the magnetism of their presence had enlarged professional ambitions and had redefined institutional success. Teaching, even in these greater places, was not outmoded—this generation of research professors spent many hours at the lectern—but the pure and simple pedagogy, even in the lesser places, could no longer regard himself as exemplary. Now the high examples all agreed that it was as much in keeping with the profession's purpose and an even more severe testing of the self to discover as well as to transfer knowledge, to submit to the judgment of one's peers as well as to the judgment of one's pupils.

Measuring the rapidity of these changes, the academic person in 1913 might have concluded that no other occupation in America had ever passed in so brief a period from the historic to the nearly new. So, too, might he have concluded that change had brought about improvements, that the profession as a whole had risen, in consequence of having been reborn. There could be no doubt that secularization, specialization, and the new premium placed upon research improved the status of the profession, both in its domestic ranking and on the competitive world exchange. Secularization turned what had been a collateral career of easy access into one that had to be specifically prepared for and that therefore enjoyed a higher standing. The division of intellectual labor abolished the old omnibus commands—those chairs of "mental and moral science, history and belles lettres"—which, in emphasizing range at the expense of mastery, had often stultified their incumbents. Thanks to the research-oriented institutions and the scientists and scholars they assembled, we were no longer an academically backward people who had to go to the Germans for edification, the way the Romans once went to the Hellenes. Further proof of elevation was provided by the increased use of professors as consultants, especially by public agencies. In 1913, the number of professors thus employed was not yet large, and their services were more technical than creative. But the fact that they were engaged at all marked an important change in public attitudes. The new academic specialist had come to be regarded as an expert. The older academic knew-it-all had seldom been able to convince society that he really knew enough.

Yet, to many a contemporary witness, the changes incident to expansion did not seem to offer unmix blessings. On the contrary, the dominant mood of 1913 was somber, vexed, and, above all, critical. "Everything about the college," wrote Henry S. Pritchett of the Carnegie Foundation, "is under the fire of the critics—its government, its teaching, its financial conduct, its ideals of social life, its right to exist at all." "Our universities," wrote Edwin Slosson, "are under fire right now from many quarters"—and he proceeded to contribute to the fusillade by assailing the graduate program for its wavering standards and misspent en-
ergies. Curiously, some of the most unsparing critics were professors, and the harshest of these were among the highest placed. Growth and transfiguration, far from creating a sense of summer, seemed to usher in a winter of discontent.

One manifestation of this discontent illustrates the complexity of its sources. In the spring of 1915, a letter signed by eighteen full professors on the faculty of the Johns Hopkins University was sent to persons of equal rank at nine other leading universities, urging them to join in the formation of a national association of professors. The letter stated that the specialized interests of academics were served by the disciplinary societies, but that their institutional and societal interests, which were equally important and pressing, were not being adequately cared for; and that for this purpose an ecumenical society was required. Many of the recipients agreed. Committees of eminent professors were formed to advance the project; 650 persons, chosen for their prominence in their disciplines, accepted the invitation to become charter members; in January, 1915, at a convention of academic luminaries, the American Association of University Professors was born. Probably the favorable response to the Hopkins "Call" owed something to the illustriousness of its audience: having moved beyond the boundaries of their campuses, the top professors were more likely to be aware of broad professional interests and to feel an academic consciousness of kind. But the success of the Hopkins "Call" owed just as much to the restiveness of its audience, to its sense that the advantages of expansion had been overlaid with liabilities, especially at the major institutions. Three such liabilities were given special emphasis in the published articles, minutes, and correspondence. Some members felt that the increase in the number of professors was debasing academic standards: growth, they said, brought attenuation. Some felt that the enlargement of academic units had given undue power to administrations: growth, they said, fostered usurpation. And some felt that greater worldliness and greater wealth tended to compromise the academy: growth, they said, made academic freedom more vulnerable than before to covert aggression. Without oversimplifying these conceptions, one might say that each touched a different professional requirement—quality, authority, security—and implied a different organizational objective—self-improvement, self-government, self-defense. I shall say little of the third conception, though in the end it was the one that triumphed. I shall focus, rather, on the other two, not only because they constituted options for an association in the making, but also because they related to important aspects of a world that had suddenly been remade.

Census figures gave the self-improvers great disquiet. In 1888, academic teaching in America had been an exiguous occupation of only 13,000 members; in 1915 when 40,000 persons could be so identified, membership in an academic faculty, whatever else it connoted, no longer conferred the distinction of rarity. Extraordinary as had been the over-all rate of growth, it was surpassed by the percentage increase of the faculties of the major institutions. Starting in 1888 with fewer than 50 on their rosters, Yale, Wisconsin, and Cornell arrived at the end of the period with 450, 520, and 750 faculty members, respectively. Nor had any sign been given that the creation of new offices was about to slacken: if anything, the constant fragmentation of knowledge and the yearning of each firm for a full display foretold the coming of yet more massive faculties. As late as 1911, for instance, Harvard augmented its faculty by ten per cent; the next year, its appetite unabated, it increased its rolls by another tenth. At this level of operation, the growing demand for personnel implied a growing demand for high abilities, and this caused a growing concern about the quality of professional recruitment (the procurement of adequate resources) and the character of institutional appointments (the use of the available supply).

Much of the concern about recruitment centered on the inadequacy of the rewards, especially the pecuniary rewards, with which the profession bid for the nation's talents. In 1908, a comprehensive survey of academic salaries, published by the Carnegie Foundation, gave statistical backing to the old impression that professors were grossly underpaid. To be sure, the survey also indicated that not every professor was abjectly poor. At the four highest-paying institutions (Harvard, Columbia, Stanford, and C. N. N. Y.), the average salary of a full professor had climbed to the $4000 level; at the five highest-bidding institutions (Harvard, Columbia, Cornell, Chicago, and Pennsylvania), the maximum salaries of full professors had gone to $5000-$8000 peaks. But the study also indicated that very few professors were allowed to take hold of these summit prizes: that at a hundred institutions with the highest payrolls, the average starting salary of a full professor was no more than $2500; that in the least munificent institutions, many veteran professors, earning less than $2000, were continuing the time-honored practice of subsidizing their institutions by their own impoverishment. And the study had not even tried to raise the veil on the earnings of instructors and assistant professors which, by one contemporary estimate, came to 30 per cent and 50 per cent of the incomes of full professors in the major places. Pointing out that the value of every stipend had been depreciated by a general rise in the cost of living, that the value of the more liberal stipends was diminished by the generally higher cost of urban living, that even the best paid professors earned little more than a minor officer in a railroad company and less than a lawyer and doctor of comparable experience, the Carnegie study made one inference unavoidable: only a nondescript capability would follow the scent of such mean rewards. A second inference could be drawn by professors with an eye to paradox: there had been an expansion of the academic plant but no expansion of the academics' pocketbook; progress coexisted with poverty and made poverty less necessary and less just.

The reappraisals of the graduate schools that be-
came common after the turn of the century also darkened the recruitment vista. The judgment of Irving Babbitt that the scholarship of the graduate schools was "a disaster to the whole of higher culture," or the allegation of William James that graduate students represented the "unfit in the academic struggle for existence," could be discounted as the hyperbole of the total enemy. But many who had once been champions of the enterprise also came to be offended by what Dean Andrew Fleming West of Princeton called its "provincialization of learning," its "dehumanization of scholarship," and its general "lowering of tone." To some extent, the new hostility of erstwhile friends reflected the spoilage of a purist hope. Originally intended to train scientists and scholars for the research-oriented institutions, the graduate school had acquired a second purpose—to stock the teaching-centered colleges with a sufficient number of Ph.D.s to meet the requirements of accreditation and to satisfy their yearning for éclat. The effect seemed to be, on the one hand, a pro forma adherence to research by trainees for whom that requirement was irrelevant; and, on the other hand, a less rigorous pursuit of research by trainees for whom the program had been designed. Moreover, mixed purposes seemed to tolerate mixed materials: it was the view of F. J. E. Woodbridge, the Columbia philosopher, that graduate students came from a cultural milieu that provided "no uniform preparation" and that hence in their turn they created "no common intellectual atmosphere of study and inquiry." It also appeared that the graduate schools, like the undergraduate schools, were becoming increasingly utilitarian. When Johns Hopkins had stood lonely on Olympus, the graduate curriculum had been confined to theoretical science and linguistic scholarship; since then, with the intrusion of graduate courses in clinical psychology, pedagogy, and agriculture (degree programs in physical education had not yet come but were in the offing), vocationalism had been married to research enthusiasm, and the results were no longer "pure." In addition to diversification, multiplication fostered a sense of loss. There were 50 graduate schools in 1913. True, four-fifths of them were small and together awarded only a quarter of the Ph.D.s. Still, with the entry of each parvenu competitor, the large established institutions would complain about the feckless dispersion of research talent, the intensified rivalry for graduate fellows, the debasement of the currency of the Ph.D. by uncontrolled and unceasing issue. Thus, from a variety of starting-points, many came to the depressing conclusion that the training institutions of the profession were failing to meet their obligations and that the academic generation then in training was less than adequate to a heightened need.

Admission to academic practice means passage through the gateway of appointment: the manner in which the gate was guarded also generated wide concern. It had long been noted in the profession that where the trustees took the initiative in appointments, favoritism, nepotism, and sectarianism were likely to infect the admission process. On this score, the major institutions, according to a study made in 1910, left very little to be desired: here the principle of trustee forbearance, which was primary assurance against a spoils system, had already firmly taken root. But it was generally understood in the profession that the governors of certain church-related colleges and certain state institutions in the South and West still played an active role in choosing faculties. Moreover, even in the major institutions, faculty participation in the selection process—which was also essential to an effective merit system—had not yet been universally assured. The 1910 survey indicated that presidents might, under certain circumstances, act alone in recommending candidates; that the chairman of departments, who were generally the appointees of the president, might be the only faculty members consulted in the process; and that even under more consensual arrangements, there were numerous opportunities for collision between the faculty's right of suggestion and the administration's right of final choice. If the limits on faculty participation were seen as one hindrance to sound appointments, the limits on faculty information were regarded as an equally grave impediment. In an expanding academic market, bidders and seekers tended to lose contact with one another. At the level of junior appointments, this problem had been in part resolved: conventions of the learned societies had already been institutionalized as employment centers where graduate students seeking offers, like marriageable females at a party, were presented by their sponsors to the wooing side. It was, however, decreed by academic custom that the better vacancies should not be advertised and that the senior candidates should not be publicized; and the effect of this protocol of reticence was a narrowing of the pick on the one side and a diminution of chances on the other. How many men of potential ability went unrecognized because of the irrationality of the market it would not now be possible to discover. But the sense that there were many unsung Miltons grew sharper as the spread of the Ph.D. requirement drew men of front-line aspirations into institutions of the lagging type.

Beyond the decision to appoint lay the critical decision to promote, and a number of professors were convinced that it too was excessively fallible. In order to compensate for the shortage of seasoned scholars and lessen the salary costs of growth, the bulk of new posts created during expansion had been of the subaltern variety that implied a limited term of service and provided a lower rate of pay. Between 1869 and 1908, the proportion of full professors on the nation's faculties had shrunk from two-thirds to one-fifth, whereas the proportion of instructors and assistant professors had gone up from one-fifth to one-third. The crowding of the bottom ranks had been even more pronounced in the major institutions: in 1908, instructors and assistant professors made up three quarters of the faculties of Harvard, Wisconsin, Yale, and the University of California. One result of the filling of the faculties with beginners, engaged but not irrevocably elected, was the routinization of a system of probation, i.e., the choosing of personnel in a two-part action—one at the point of intake, the
other prior to retention, following a period of trial. In theory, the probationary system offered the novice the advantage of an internship and the institution the benefit of a closer look. In practice, according to certain critics, the system worked with perverse effect. This was the finding of Guido Marx, an engineering professor at Stanford, with a sympathetic interest in the academic journeyman, who studied the lot of the assistant professor at twenty major institutions in 1910. The composite portrait that emerged from his study was that of a not-so-young probationer oppressed by the burdens of the low-rank life. The typical assistant professor had entered the portals as an instructor at the age of 27; had been promoted to his current rank at 31; and was still waiting for the next elevation at the rather advanced age of 38. Typically, his primary function was to relieve his seniors of the burden of elementary instruction and the tedium of examination grading; at the same time, he was obliged to carry on his own research in order to qualify for promotion. But, typically, he did not know when that promotion would be considered, since the length of the probationary period had not been stipulated, and the ultimate decision, when arrived at, was likely to be made by the department head, whose judgment might be capricious but whose recommendatory word was often law. Designed as a means for preserving standards at a time when too many major openings were seeking too few proven men, the system, according to Professor Marx, exploited and retarded apprentice scholars in the very years when they were asked to reveal their worth.

Many of the professors who had lamented the trend in quality were prominent in the early councils of the Association and they filled its provisional agenda with a variety of proposals for reform. Some would have had the professional association take hold of professional education: conceding to the AAU, the agency of graduate school administrators, no squatter rights in this domain, they proposed that the AAUP should standardize graduate requirements, eliminate duplication of effort, encourage student peregrination, foster cooperation in the award of fellowships, and even accredit—and discredit—the graduate schools in line with the therapeutic precedent that had recently been set by the AMA. Some would have had the Association reduce the irrationality of the market by setting up an employment agency. Some would have had the Association impose on a chaos of practices one professionally-endorsed appointments system. Some would have had the Association cope with the malfunctions of the probation system: limited and fixed periods of service, a lighter burden of instruction, the democratizing of departmental management were among the remedies proposed. Only a small number wanted the Association to deal with the issue of salaries: here, fear of the trade union label, plus certain lingering inhibitions inherited from a clerical past, interposed early hesitations. There was no agreement among these members as to which task should take priority and there were few tasks on whose importance all of the members agreed. But it cannot be doubted that, when massed together, the advocates of self-improvement constituted a majority of the founding body. Certainly, this group had no shortage of celebrities, as the names of John Dewey, John H. Wigmore, Basil Gildersleeve, and E. R. A. Seligman will attest.

I would fail to give a rounded picture if I left out the one proposal on which there was very broad agreement—that the Association should promulgate and enforce a code of professional ethics. This proposal, though separate from the concerns I have mentioned, summarized the implicit biases of this contingent: its desire to emulate the achievements of the paragon associations in law and medicine; its wish to ready the profession for greater and more responsible public tasks; its belief that the guild had grown too large and too heterogeneous to be governed by the restraints of an informal etiquette. In 1914, the outlines of a possible code were sketched by Howard C. Warren, one of the leading promoters of the Association. It was the view of the Princeton psychologist that “the functions of the new Association should by no means be confined to the relations between faculty and corporation. Indeed,” he went on to say, “its most promising work seems to be in other fields. The adjustment of the relations between professor and student, between scholar and the world at large, and between scholar and scholar come distinctly within its province.” Ignoring the bureaucratic context, Warren could more easily equate the ethical problems of the academic with those of the self-employed professional, particularly the medical doctor. On the relation of the professional to society, the medical code declared that it was the doctor’s duty to contribute to public health; the academic code might follow suit and enjoin professors to contribute to the public’s enlightenment. The medical code opposed the patenting of medical discoveries; the academic code might take a stand against the patenting of scientific discoveries. Concerning the relations of the professor to the student-client, Warren mentioned only one ethical perplexity: should the professor have exclusive title to the fruit of a collaborative effort? Here the medical analog might have raised other mooted questions: should professors, like doctors, regard the confidence of their clients as inviolable? Should professors, like doctors, temper instruction with discretion when confronting uninitiated minds? Under the third heading—the relations between professional and coprofessional—Warren cited several issues for which the medical field supplied analogies. He believed that the professors’ code might prohibit “undignified pleas for advancement in one’s own behalf” (the medical code frowned on self-advertisement), and that it might protect “the junior members . . . from undue exactions by their superiors” (the medical code commended mutual civility). Finally, he thought the academic code might determine whether “a professor in good standing should accept a chair from which a colleague has been removed without a trial.” The latter proposition, which recalled the non-supplantation clause in the doctor’s canon, raised (though it did not answer) the question of whether the academic profession might properly ethicize a protective boycott.
Nothing was said by Warren about the question of enforcement, but the implication was that the Association, like the medical beau ideal, would impose its sanctions on an erring member and not simply codify pious saws.

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When we turn to the interest in self-government we confront a more passionate and coherent, and a much more controversial, aspiration. Early in the twentieth century, a group of publicists and professors began to revitalize a cause that had long lain dormant in this country—the right of the members of the faculties to govern or manage their institutions. Not since the 1820's when a number of Harvard professors had sought vainly to regain control of their Corporation, had academic self-government been a lively topic; and never before had the quest for guild autonomy acquired the characteristics of a movement—a widely recognized leader, specific organs of propaganda, an inflamed and inflammatory rhetoric, a class-conscious if rudimentary ideology. The leader was J. McKeen Cattell, head of a famous psychological laboratory at Columbia, editor of Science and Popular Science Monthly, founder and one-time president of the American Psychological Association. The involvement of this academic factotum in the movement did much to increase its volubility. He himself was a tireless propagandist; by opening the pages of his journals to those who shared his disaffections, he inspired much Jacobin writing; following his lead and in his style, there was an outpouring of articles in the calmer journals from those who felt the insurgent itch. In 1913, Cattell brought many of these articles together in a book called University Control, the one book to which Thorstein Veblen acknowledged his indebtedness in his Higher Learning in America (original subtitle: A Study in Total Depravity). Whatever its merits and demerits, this literary genre did not suffer from understatement. These authors compared the faculty under the current system to a citizenry “disenfranchised” in its own republic, to a group of “place-seekers and placeholders” dancing attendance on a monarch, to a populace cowering under a tyrant’s heel. Or, using more homespun but equally splanetic metaphors, they likened the condition of the professor to that of the “humblest clerk in a department store,” to a mariner on a ship that others piloted, or—simply—to a “hired hand.” At the same time, these authors were confident that the professor, despite his current degradation, had the skill and appetite to govern. All that could truthfully be said about the inaptitude of the professor for administration they ascribed to the perniciousness of his environment; most of the managerial tasks that were said to require nonacademic talent they regarded as fit details for clerks. Perhaps in viewing the professor as debunked and as simultaneously touched with grace, in describing academic government as both autocratic and susceptible to drastic change, these authors were asserting contradictions. If so, theirs was the contradictory vision on which ideologists seeking power always thrive.

It would be tempting, but quite fallacious, to dismiss the movement as the artifact of a very few difficult personalities. It is quite true that the leaders of the movement were incessant grumblers. On the basis of their biographies, one might revise the adage to read: those who would destroy the gods are first made very mad. Joseph Jastrow of Wisconsin, a leading ideologue of insurgency, had had disputes over his salary with his administration before he announced that the faculty should be the judge of its own rewards. George T. Ladd, the Yale psychologist, wrote his first brief for faculty autonomy (called "The Degradation of the Professorial Office") while in the thick of a battle to protect his own professorial office. And the campus brawls of the lieutenants paled in comparison with the running battles between the leader of the movement and the head of his academic institution. Between the imperious Nicholas Murray Butler and the caustic and choleric Cattell, conflict was almost unavoidable: a president who could sneer at the faculty’s “assumption of infallibility” and a professor who could call his president an “autocrat” in direct address were ripe for war without much goading. It was probably not an accident that Cattell’s earliest statement favoring faculty control coincided with Butler’s inauguration, and there is little doubt that when he called the typical president “a bronze statue of himself created by public subscription” he was sculpting the type from life. But not everyone can be said to have extrapolated a political science from a disagreeable personal experience. Consider, for example, the response of the thousand leading men of science to whom Cattell submitted his specific program. Intended more as a working-paper than a finished blueprint, the Cattell program called for the conversion of boards of trustees into quasi-public corporations elected by the faculty and community; the transformation of the president from an agent plenipotentiary of the board to an administrative functionary of the faculty, with salary and perquisites reduced accordingly; the cession of financial and educational control to an elected faculty senate and a confederacy of small departmental states. On the strength of their confidential replies, Cattell concluded that the vast majority of the leading scientists supported his proposal. Probably not: less than a third of the group was heard from and silence must have meant dissent. Of the 299 respondents, 15 per cent liked things as they were, 22 per cent desired better mechanisms of consultation with minor structural changes, 63 per cent wanted radical reforms, but some of these seemed to think up model governments more in the spirit of a game than with the vehemence of mutiny. Nevertheless, a significant percentage did disclose that they disapproved of the existing order. Coming from what should have been the thanksgiving portion of the professoriat, these auricular statements of discontent proved that the leaders of insurgency spoke for something more than their private pikes.

Notable in this literature of dissent, and a clue to its deeper meaning, was the special animosity it displayed toward the office and person of the president. Legally, the governing board was the fountain of au-
though; but the twentieth century insurgents, unlike their forerunners, took as their fundamental premise that "the system is concentrated in the president" and they lavished an invective on the deputy that they seldom visited on the source. The choice of the penultimate target must, I think, also be perceived as a consequence of expansion. For more than two centuries, ligatures between the president and the faculty had been established by a shared religious purpose, a common pedagogic function, a similar intellectual background and continuous face-to-face address. In the new age, this intimacy was disrupted. The laicism of the presidency, which went along with the unfrocking of the faculty, destroyed the primitive cohesion that had been the gift of a religious aim. The new president abandoned teaching and research to concentrate on administration: the cleavage of academe into two vocations ended the harmony of a shared routine. Still a third factor sapped the old relationships: the introduction of bureaucratic methods into places that had once been governed *en famille*. With the transfer of administrative duties from the president to a registrar and comptroller, with the delegation of executive authority to a graded lieutenancy of deans, the relations of the president to the faculty became less direct and more impersonal. Separation, if it did not automatically create hostility, did create dissonant self-perceptions. In a pre-Hilton Mayo environment, the president, perched atop a hierarchy, was likely to regard the faculty as subordinates to whom he could state wishes as commands. But the faculty, as it gained prominence in the specialties, was likely to regard the president, who was a specialist in nothing but administration, as organizationally very powerful but academically second-class. Given the tendency of the boards to relinquish initiative to the president, given the tendency of the status aspirations of the faculty to outstrip status gains, the stage was set for that clash of expectancies, that divorce of legitimacy from power, that has troubled faculty-administration relationships to this very day.

Before the insurgent answer came, there were further fissures and disappointments. It may be noted that, down to the end of the nineteenth century, when it was necessary to transmute colleges into universitites, no better instrument was at hand than the strong, ambitious, and prophetic president. While he fought his battles against entrenched conservativism, the president was deemed a useful person by members of the newly constituted faculties who were themselves the symbol of his success. A radical assault upon his office could not be mounted until after the turn of the century, when the universities were well established, the generation of innovating presidents had been replaced by an epigoni of consolidators, and the charge of diminishing utility could be added to the grievances on the list. It may also be noted that many presidents, especially in the major institutions, sought to forge new ties through varied organizational devices. Much as they differed in tact and official circumstances, they recognized the need to demarcate certain institutional provinces where the professional spirit could be accommodated and which the professional man could call his own. Thus, they recognized the classroom as the teacher’s sanctuary and fenced it off from administrative patrol. Thus, too, they sponsored the organization of departments. In addition, they attempted to bridge the two vocations by installing mechanisms of consultation—faculty-administration committees to deal with educational issues, senates chaired by administrators to discuss university-wide concerns. When first installed, these devices promised to establish a working partnership in which the two groups, while differentiated as to function, might seem coordinate in importance and responsibility. Inevitably, however, such a promise ran into conflict with the realities of power and overriding organizational needs. The Balkanization of the faculty led to departmental rivalries which sometimes led to administrative intercession and the imposition of a flat peace. The confessional program went just so far: major financial questions, which held the key to other questions, were usually excluded from the joint agendas; the foreign affairs of the institution remained in the hands of administrators. Few collaborative committees ever developed such iron authority that they could never be bypassed by a president; few presidents acquired so much saintly patience that they always abided by committee processes. Presidential practices varied among different institutions: the president of wealthy Yale could better afford the luxury of slow debate than the president of crisis-ridden Clark; the president of tradition-bound Harvard had less freedom of evasive maneuver than the president of traditionless Chicago. But nowhere was perfection achieved: even at Yale and Harvard, the president would occasionally violate the letter or the spirit of a joint procedure in order to accomplish a key result. The extent to which a professor became cynical about these myriad small and large corruptions was a good measure of his insurgent quotient. Cattell and his cohorts concluded that the entire purpose of placing faculty members on committees was to mire them in trivialities and make them seem ludicrous even to themselves.

At some point a movement turns to organization: this point was reached by the insurgent movement in 1913. Encouraged by the response to his questionnaire, Cattell (three months before the Hopkins "Call") wrote that the time had come "to form an organization of professors" that would cope with "the problem of administration." He did not undertake to organize the project on his own—and this was just as well, for his reputation as an *enfant terrible* would have frightened off many genteel souls. But once the project was launched, he worked to evangelize his colleagues and to help to make it a success. The early lists of the Association show that all of the prominent insurgents enrolled, presumably to effect the change they desired in the relations of the leaders and the led.

... ...

What happened to these pre-natal interests? On paper.
they continued to exist post-partum. In the first year, the Association set up only one committee—that on academic freedom and tenure—which acquired alphabetical supremacy. But the second year’s flowering of committees gave full recognition to self-improvement; thus, Committee B, on Appointment and Promotion; Committee C, on Recruitment of the Profession; Committee D, on Classification of Universities and Colleges; Committee H, on Migration of Graduate Students; Committee I, on University Ethics. The interest in self-government was acknowledged when Committee T was established in 1918, with J. A. Leighton of Ohio as chairman and J. McKeen Cattell (still of, but soon to be separated from, Columbia) a not inconspicuous member. However, it was not until after the war that this committee stated its position and by that time, it had not only lost Cattell but something of the latter’s fierce guild complex. The pronunciamento issued in 1920 did not demand a reconstitution of the board or the elimination of the president as an academic power. On the other hand, it did retain some of the flavor of insurgency. It called for direct and unmediated communication between the faculty and the board of trustees, the nomination of the president by this duumvirate, the delegation of primary control over educational policy to the faculty, and (lest this be a shadow without substance) the participation of the faculty in all budgetary decisions that bore, even indirectly, on the teaching role. The final proof that the young Association remained true to the full range of parental concepts can be found in the establishment of two more committees: Committee P on Pensions, which was set up to cope with the sudden termination of the Carnegie system of free annuities, and Committee Z on Economic Conditions, which was set up in response to the sharp inflation that struck the profession after the war.

But it would not be a distortion of the truth (nor, I trust, an injustice to the many years of committee effort) to say that the AAUP, certainly down to the end of its first four decades, accomplished very little in these arenas. In 1956, an objective observer would have had to conclude that the AAUP was Committee A, to all practical and apparent purposes. Only Committee A had used the weapons that had been proved both acceptable and efficacious: exposure through investigation, shaming by explicit naming, the promulgation of codes that are negotiated into compacts with administrators. After issuing its manifesto, Committee T lapsed for a decade, was revived in the middle-Thirties, surveyed the scene and found it wanting, sank out of sight and then emerged again—an indestructible spirit, but a totally invertebrate ghost. Committee P helped the TIAA improve its pension system, but Committee Z, a fact-collecting body, merely proved through anonymous statistics that professors were being repeatedly immiserated by further inflations and a great depression. The committee on appointments and promotions turned out to be one of the weakest of the central organs; a professional placement bureau was established and then abandoned after several years; a code of ethics was never formulated.

The first dozen annual meetings were given over to educational discussions; afterwards, the conventions addressed themselves to other things. Such concrete effects as were recorded in the realms apart from Committee A were largely ricochets from its endeavors. Thus, the Association did not do much directly to improve the working conditions of probationers; but it did do much to reduce and standardize the length of the probationary period, this by way of defending tenure. It did not use effective weapons to increase the participation of professors in the legislative processes of the university, but it did use its entire arsenal to increase the participation of professors in the judicial processes of the university, this to bolster academic freedom. In 1956, such a summary view of what had happened to the original triad of possibilities would have lacked only one important nuance: the influence of the local chapters, and their vast, but difficult to appraise, good works.

It could be argued, with superficial persuasiveness, that only one of the triad of possibilities ever had a reasonable chance of working: that history, like nature, chooses the most perfectly adapted forms. A Darwinian argument of inevitability might go as follows: of the three interests growing out of expansion, only one—the interest in self-protection—could survive the pressures of expansion. The desire to make the profession more selective, more duty-conscious and more refined could not avail against the economic forces that were making it more distended and complex. Conceivably, the professors, taking a page from the doctors’ book, might have resorted to licensing controls to sift abilities and reduce the flow. Perhaps it would have occurred to some of them to try to do so, had they conceived themselves as teachers and nothing else. In a sense, teaching is the analogue of healing: however subtle as an art, it lends itself to specifications of minimal requirements of skill and training. But the professors’ commitment to research led to the inhibiting assumptions that, since inquiring minds are not interchangeable, each academic inquirer is unique; that, since science can never have enough practitioners, there can never be too many academic jobs; that exclusiveness must be the product of unique achievements and not of exclusionary acts. With the tendency to grow thus left immutable, the urge to improve could not take effect. Self-government, the argument might proceed, was also impeded by persistent growth. Growth introduced institutional complexities that made for ever more complex modes of management; growth produced an opulent poverty that made colleges illusory sponges and presidents indispensable beggars; growth made professors more ambivalent about assuming administrative responsibilities which they perceived both as a privilege and a cross. On the other hand, the interest in self-protection accorded well with a growing universe: greater numbers merely amplified the call for enlightened neglect and job security; investigations of suspect dismissals touched professional evils singly, not en masse.

Or one might argue that the problem of standardization, which must be solved before there can be codes.
and compacts, was soluble only in the freedom-tenure area. To standardize is to simplify, quantify, and reduce exceptions. Committee A was able to simplify the principle of academic freedom by stressing its prohibitory aspects; to quantify the norm of tenure by giving it an arithmetic basis; to universalize the concept of due process by deriving it from a legal culture in which it had already been universalized. But it was not possible, so the argument might run, to extend this accomplishment to other areas. Against Committee A's simple deca
dologue of "shall-nots," its seven-year rule for probation, its encompassing rule of due procedure, place the infinite varieties of sin that will have to be governed by a code of ethics, the incommensurability of salaries and of the paying capacities of institutions, the subtleties of faculty-administration relations, where custom counts more than legislation and spirit more than form. The elusiveness of the neglected issues might thus provide a second argument for the view that what happened, had to be.

The clock restrains me from developing at length what I regard as a sounder explanation—namely, that the atrophy of original aims was the result of a series of historic accidents. To do no more than list what deserves full explication, I would mention the fact that an unprecedentedly large number of academic freedom cases broke out in the Association's natal year; that Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy, the chief protagonist of self-protection, made use of his secretarial office to involve the Association in these cases, he himself being the chief and sometimes sole investigator; that his reports were models of their kind, the monumental products of a truly magisterial intelligence; that the publication of these reports immediately publicized the Association as the avenger of academic crimes, and led to further calls for intervention; that the new inquiries, though selectively undertaken, strained the resources of a small and exclusive body that could afford only one part-time paid official; that, in time, the Association had to lower its admission standards to enhance its income, with the result that it became more responsive to appeals from the less privileged and more embattled set; that, as it evolved from an elite to a mass society, the Association began to deal with complaints in a routine, rather than ad hoc, fashion; that work of the guardian variety, as it appropriated the energies of the Association, tended to close off initiatives in other areas—e.g., in the field of academic ethics (the tendency of a defense psychology is to ignore or extenuate in-group flaws) and in the field of academic government (it would have been provocative and undiplomatic to have pressed for legislative prerogatives while negotiating with administrators over freedom rights). More can be said about the adventitious sequence, but this is enough to argue against predestination. Nor can it be maintained that the momentum of accident followed a course of least resistance. Committee A did not deal with always tractable realities. The dissociation of tenure from rank and its linkage to years of service—a critical move toward standardization—was not effected by Committee A until 1940, and then over administrative resistance; despite the general claims that were made for freedom, the denominational institution was never brought under a covering law. Moreover, as the recent efforts of Committee Z and Committee T make clear, there was no reason why the other subject areas could not be rationalized, given the requisite energy and will. In the last reviving decade, Committee Z, under the guidance of Professor Fritz Machlup, evolved a salary-rating scheme that improved the comparability of remunerations, held all institutions to a single standard, and measured performance by familiar grades; Committee T, also reborn in that fertile decade, resumed the task of codification with imagination. Once ingenuity tamed complexity, it became possible for these Committees to improve their armories: Committee Z now exposes through self-inquiry and capitalizes on the power of invidiousness by naming and rating institutions; Committee T now exposes through external inquiry and is working toward an inter-party pact.

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Mention of the work of the revived committees gives me a hopeful cue on which to close. Once again, we are in an epoch of immense expansion. Once again, we have reason to be concerned about the erosion of the better by the more, about the quality of our training centers, about the use and overuse of probationers and the new use of tenure-excluded persons, about all sorts of ethical problems ranging from the right of professors to neglect their students to their right to use them in dismissal controversies, about the decision-making role of professors in institutions that have grown even more complex. It is true that we are limited by the paradox of disapproving the excesses of expansion while accepting the permanence of expansion. But three points must be borne in mind, lest we yield to the pessimistic doctrine that a growing world must defy our will. The first is that the organization has been the beneficiary of this expansion, and is now rich and large enough to establish programs that were heretofore merely paupers' dreams. The second point is that the gains of Committee A have created, if not a benign existence, at least a plateau of security from which other ventures can be launched. The third point is that nature abhors a vacuum. We can be sure that the question of allocation of resources between cyclotrons and classrooms, the question of the uses of subfaculties, the question of sanctions for professional impropriety will be answered, if not by the organized professors, then by those who dealt with them before—the possessors of material and legal power. But I am persuaded by signs of current animation that the Association has begun to spread its compass just as many had hoped it would 50 years ago. Fifty years from now, the historian of the Association may well be able to refer not only to a century of consistent progress, but also to a provident middle-course return.