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State of the Profession: Academic Freedom on the Network
By Martin D. Snyder
Things got pretty hot last summer on the campus of Marquette University. The cause was not some local manifestation of global warming. Rather, it was psychic heat that was generated from a seemingly benign source: the installation of some new software on the university’s computer network.
The administration’s plan was to load a network-monitoring tool on all computers. The new software was to be installed universally, not just on publicly available machines in computer labs, but on faculty computers as well. The software the administration selected is particularly powerful. According to the manufacturer’s claims, it allows the information technology staff to resolve computer problems remotely from their desks; they can also identify out-of-date and unsanctioned software, change system parameters, modify addresses, and carry out a host of other functions. The power of the software clearly appealed to those who made the decision to install it: the IT administration and the Desktop Management Focus Group.
The new software, however, has many more capabilities. It allows IT staff to move, copy, and delete files and folders, create aliases, install and update folders, browse a workstation’s directory structures, and launch a file or terminate a process. In simple terms, it permits IT staff to snoop at will. Secret passwords provide no protection.
Faculty members at Marquette reacted swiftly and strongly to the decision to install the new software. They did not question the motives behind the administration’s decision. No one suggested nefarious or even unreasonable intent. What the faculty saw, and the administration apparently did not, were the larger implications of the software decision. The IT folks eventually concluded that installing the software on faculty machines was "too hot" to pursue and gave up the attempt. No damage was done, but this "near miss" is instructive. It raises several important issues.
First is the issue of academic freedom. It is not the function of the IT staff to determine what material faculty members select to prepare their courses, what they choose to load onto their computers, what software is best suited for instruction, and how and when it may be used. These are matters of faculty discretion. Clearly, mechanisms of cooperation between the faculty and the IT staff are necessary, but the IT administration must recognize the primacy of the faculty’s role in the educational mission of the institution. The computer network must support, not direct, that role. The issue is not one of control or efficiency; it is something that cuts right to the heart of what higher education is all about.
The second issue has to do with governance. Among the areas for which faculty has primary responsibility are curriculum and subject matter, research, and those areas of student life that relate to the educational process. Network software that directly or indirectly restricts the faculty’s choice of teaching material, jeopardizes research data, or potentially breaches the confidentiality of faculty-student relationships should be installed only after careful and full consultation with the faculty. A small group of faculty "techies" or a restricted focus group does not constitute an adequate consultative faculty body. The greater the impact on the work of the faculty, the more extensive is the degree of consultation required. And computer monitoring software affects every faculty member.
There is finally the issue of privacy. Computer networks are unquestionably the property of the educational institution. Still, faculty members are no more amenable to network snooping than they are to having their paper files randomly inspected by administrators. Clear policies need to be collaboratively developed to specify the degree of privacy a faculty member might reasonably expect. And the policies must be scrupulously observed.
It is heartening that the IT administration at Marquette ultimately decided to rethink its decision to install monitoring software on faculty computers. Swift and attentive action of alert faculty members helped the university avoid a serious mistake. In so acting, the faculty placed themselves in the distinguished company of the federal judiciary, which recently prevented the installation of similar monitoring software on a computer network used by 30,000 court employees, including 1,800 tenured judges. Undoubtedly, we will see similar situations arising on other campuses. Can it be that such monitoring software has already been installed on some campuses without the faculty even knowing about it?
Martin Snyder is AAUP program director for academic freedom and governance.
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